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 This dissertation studies models for the analysis of market efficiency and 
bidding behaviors of market participants in electricity markets. Simulation models are 
developed to estimate how transmission and operational constraints affect the 
competitive benchmark and market prices based on submitted bids. This research 
contributes to the literature in three aspects. First, transmission and operational 
constraints, which have been neglected in most empirical literature, are considered in 
the competitive benchmark estimation model. Second, the effects of operational and 
transmission constraints on market prices are estimated through two models based on 
the submitted bids of market participants. Third, these models ar  applied to analyze the 
efficiency of the Electric Reliability Council Of Texas (ERCOT) real-time energy 
market by simulating its operations for the time period from January 2002 to April 
2003. The characteristics and available information for the ERCOT market are 
considered.  
 In electricity markets, electric firms compete through both spot market bidding 
and bilateral contract trading. A linear asymmetric supply function equilibrium (SFE) 
model with transmission constraints is proposed in thisdis ertation to analyze the 
bidding strategies with forward contracts. The research contributes to the literature in 
several aspects. First, we combine forward contracts, transmission constraints, and 
multi-period strategy (an obligation for firms to bid consistently over an extended time 
 vii
horizon such as a day or an hour) into the linear asymmetric supply function 
equilibrium framework. As an ex-ante model, it can provide qualitative insights into 
firms’ behaviors. Second, the bidding strategies related to Transmission Congestion 
Rights (TCRs) are discussed by interpreting TCRs as linear combination of forwards. 
Third, the model is a general one in the sense that there is no limitation on the number 
of firms and scale of the transmission network, which can h ve asymmetric linear 
marginal cost structures. In addition to theoretical analysis, we apply our model to 
simulate the ERCOT real-time market from January 2002 to April 2003. The effects of 
forward contracts on the ERCOT market are evaluated throug  the results. It is shown 
that the model is able to capture features of bidding behavior in the market. 
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CHAPTER 1:  OVERVIEW  
1.1 BACKGROUND  
During the last 15 years, the regulatory framework for the w olesale sector of 
the electricity industry has been replaced in many countries by forces of market 
competition in order to produce electricity efficiently and reliably. Currently, there are 
more than a dozen existing restructured electricity markets in the United States and 
around the world1. These markets vary in terms of the market organization, system 
operation, transmission charges, congestion management, arket mitigations, and 
investment incentives. These differences are often motivated by characteristics of the 
existing systems (e.g., generation mix, network topology, and pool arrangement), 
historical realities, asset ownership, operational practices, and philosophical 
perspectives. 
Although extensive effort has been involved in electricity restructuring, there is 
a continuing debate over various aspects of electricity market design. Each market has 
changed in some aspects because of various difficulties and problems experienced. 
Some markets have undertaken big changes, such as the California market and the 
England and Wales market. The California market ended its zonal Power Exchange and 
is implementing its new proposed market design 2002, “MD02.” The England and 
Wales electricity market changed from a centrally dispatched bid-based power pool to 
the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) based on bilateral trading in a 
forward market. Other restructured markets, including the Electric Reliability Council 
of Texas (ERCOT), have changed more incrementally. 
                                               
1 Restructured U.S. electricity markets identified by their Independent System Operators (ISOs): 
California ISO (CAISO); Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Marylnd Interconnection (PJM); New York ISO 
(NYISO); ISO-New England (ISONE), Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).  U.S. electricity 
markets undergoing development or changes: California Market Design 2002 (MD02) and Mid-West ISO 
(MISO). Examples of international electricity markets: Independent Electricity System Operator 
(formerly called Independent Electricity Market Operator (IMO) of Ontario, Power Pool of Alberta, New 
Energy Trading Arrangement (NETA) of England and Wales, Nordic Power Exchange (Nord Pool), 
National Electricity Market (NEM) of Australia; New Zealand Electricity Market (NZEM). 
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The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) proposed Standard 
Market Design (SMD) to unify best practices in market design, and to enhance 
competition in electricity markets under its jurisdiction. Since it is impossible to 
recommend a solution that fits all situations, the SMD allows for regional variations. 
Currently every U.S. electricity market is seeking ways to improve market design based 
on its regional realities. 
Underlying the growing debates over the appropriate organization of the 
electricity markets, there is a critical need for the evaluation of electricity market 
performance that are already operating and the understanding of market participants’ 
behaviors. Before making any decisions on market design or revision, it will be helpful 
and instructive to evaluate the effects of the current policy.  
The objective of deregulation is to supply electricity efficiently resulting in 
lower price by replacing the regulatory scheme for the wolesale sector with market 
competition. In a perfectly competitive electricity market, the market price should be 
the marginal cost of electricity production. However, if market competition is weak, 
electricity markets may fail to force prices down to the marginal cost. The ability to 
alter the market price from the competitive level is defined to be market power.  
Even though a perfectly competitive market is the objectiv of the electricity 
industry restructuring, there is no such perfect market in practice. Many issues can 
contribute to market inefficiency, such as market design flaws, abuse of market power, 
and inherent engineering features of power system operations. Several characteristics of 
electricity markets facilitate the exercise of market power. These characteristics include:  
inelastic demand and the lack of timely responses by some consumers to price 
variations, limited transmission capacity, and the system engineering requirement that 
supply and demand must balance continuously. Some research shows that peculiarities 
of electricity markets can make a large difference in market power in electricity markets 
(Scherer (1990), Oren (1997)). Market power could result in market prices that deviate 
from competitive prices. 
Because each electricity market has its unique features and policies, analyzing 
market performance and behaviors of market participants is still an open research area. 
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Given the historical structure of the electric industry, it is not surprising to expect big 
firms have more market power than smaller ones. During most of the 1990s, regulatory 
evaluation of market power focused on concentration measur s, such as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI). Unfortunately, such measures are not adequate to indicate the 
exercise of market power in the electricity industry. The reason is that the electricity 
industry is characterized by highly inelastic demand, short-run supply constraints, 
transmission constraints, and extremely costly storage (Borenstein, Bushnell, and 
Knittel (1999)). In such circumstances, firms with very small market shares could 
exercise significant market power. The presence of transmission constraints presents 
further opportunities for exercising market power regardless of the degree of 
concentration (Oren (1997a), Cardell, Hitt and Hogan (1997), Baldick and Kahn 
(1997)). Therefore, the HHI index only is not sufficient for market power analysis in an 
electricity market.  
Alternative ways to analyze market power in electricity markets have been 
developed, among which the empirical analysis and oligopoly game theory models are 
broadly performed. The empirical analysis approaches estimate the performance of 
market or a firm by estimating price-cost margin for a system or a firm. The oligopoly 
game theory models analyze firms’ behaviors by developing optimal bid strategies for 
firms and evaluating the market equilibrium prices.   
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. The physical 
characteristics of electric power and their roles in this dissertation are described in 
section 1.2. Empirical analysis approaches are reviewed in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 
reviews the oligopoly game theory models applied in electricity markets. Finally, the 
contributions of this dissertation to the literature of electricity market analysis are 
summarized in section 1.5. 
1.2 PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS  
Even though the electricity industry restructuring aims to replace regulation with 
forces of market competition, the operation of the electric power system has to obey 
physical rules of electric systems. The importance of ngineering characteristics for the 
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electricity markets has been addressed by Bai (1997), Oren (1997), Cardell, Hilt and 
Hogan (1997), Younes and Ilic (1998), Borenstein, Bushness and Stoft (2000), Stoft 
(2002), Baldick (2003), De la Torre, Conejo and Contreras (2003). 
In this section, we first describe the major physical characteristics of electric 
power systems in 1.2.1. Then the importance of these characteristics and their roles in 
this dissertation are discussed in subsections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3.  
1.2.1 Kirchhopf’s laws and the transmission system 
Different from markets for other commodities, electricity markets are highly 
constrained by the effect of Kirchhopf’s laws applied to the electric transmission 
system. By the Kirchhoff’s first law, the current flow into any node in a circuit equals to 
the current flow out of the node. The second Kirchhoff’s law is that the voltage drop 
around any loop equals to zero. 
Based on the Kirchhoff’s laws, the produced power within an interconnected 
power system should equal to the consumed power within it. Th s is called power 
balance. Electric power is measured by Watts, which is t e product of the voltage drop 
through an electrical element and the current through that element. The relationship 
between the voltage drop and current through an electrical element depends on the 
characteristics of that element. For a transmission line, the electrical current flowing 
through it equals to the voltage drop across the line divided by its impedance, consisted 
of line resistance and line reactance. The power loss through a transmission line equals 
to the square of the line current due to real power flow times the line resistance. 
In order to operate an electric power system reliably, the system power supply 
has to equal to the system power demand, and the power flo  through the transmission 
lines has to be within the transmission limits of these lines. The process to dispatch 
generators to meet the power balance within the system transmission capacity with 
minimal cost is called the Optimal Power Flow (OPF) process. The OPF process is the 
basis for the market clearing mechanism of electricity markets.  
The engineering characteristics of electric power system  are not only very 
important for the market clearing process, but also are ve y important for structures of 
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electricity markets. In subsections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3, we discuss why power balance and 
transmission are important for electric power system operation and electricity markets.  
 1.2.2 Importance of the power balance 
Unlike other commodities, operation of electric power systems is complicated 
by the lack of economical ways to store energy. System supply and demand balance 
must be maintained all the time. Any imbalance between supply and demand will drive 
the system frequency to deviate from its standard level(60Hz in United States). When 
the system supply is greater than the system demand in an i terconnected power 
network, the frequency will increase. In contrast, when the system supply is less than 
the system demand, the frequency will decrease. Here, the supply and demand balance 
emphasizes the real power balance. However, the reactiv  power balance is also 
important. If electric devices take out reactive power too much locally, voltage will sag 
in that area. If reactive power is injected too much local y, voltage will increase in that 
area. 
Frequency and voltage are the two fundamental characteristics related to the 
quality of delivered power. If frequency or voltage deviates from their standard level 
above the allowed ranges, customers will encounter trouble with the power delivered to 
them. Every generator in the system must be synchronized with every other generator in 
the AC interconnection, which may extend over millions f quare miles. The deviation 
of the system frequency may cause added wear and tear for some electrical machines. 
Synchronous motors run at a speed proportional to frequency. Many motors will run 
faster and draw more power when frequency increases. High voltage may cut the life of 
some electric devices. Low voltage can cause the under performing of some motors. 
In order to provide power with high qualities, the system operator has to 
maintain the system balance all the time. However, since there are unpredictable 
fluctuations in system loads and generators, it is difficult to keep the system balance all 
the time. Ancillary services are very important to improve the system’s ability to 
withstand sudden disturbances, such as a breakdown of physical component of the 
power system.  If an operating generator breaks down, it may be hard to keep the 
balance between supply and demand. Then system frequency and voltage may drop. If 
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they drop too far for too long, load must be shed to retain system supply and demand 
balance. However, if appropriate ancillary services are available, the lost power can be 
replaced by ancillary services. Then system operator will be able to keep the system 
balance without shedding load. 
Voltage normally drops as power flows from generators t load. The more 
power flows, the more voltage drops. Usually the voltage drop through transmission 
lines may be able to be compensated by adjusting transformers. Injection of reactive 
power is another way to counteract the voltage drop. Some electric devices, such as 
capacitors and synchronous condensers, inject reactive power, which can cause the 
voltage to increase. Even though supplying reactive power does not consume fuel, it 
will reduce the ability of a generator to produce real power. 
The system operator can purchase ancillary reserves throug  market 
mechanisms or contracts. The reactive power is difficult to transmit, because its 
transmission losses are much higher than the losses of real power.  Normally, the 
system operator purchases long-term contracts for the service of providing reactive 
power. In addition, in order to maintain the system balance in real-time, electricity 
markets normally include a day-ahead market or schedule process, an hour-ahead 
market or evaluation process, and a real-time market. This structure of markets is 
helpful to tracking the predictable and large scale fluctuations in supply and demand 
before real-time. 
1.2.3 Transmission network 
Transmission network is also very important to maintain system balance and to 
supply electric power with high quality. Even when there is enough supply to meet 
demand, transmission network has to be able to transfer the needed supply to the load. 
Otherwise, the system balance still cannot be maintained. 
Compared with other kind of networks, electric transmision system is very 
fragile. The flow through the transmission line cannot exceed certain level. Otherwise, 
overheat may cause the overloaded transmission lines sag permanently or even to melt. 
Even most high-voltage transmission lines have automatic relay protective devices 
which can take them out of services when the current approaches to a certain level, 
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taking one line out may cause the cutting of other lines and disrupting services to some 
customers. It can also create voltage stability problems, which may result in black out of 
the system. 
The transmission line limits depend on many factors. First, there are thermal 
limits, which are the heat tolerance threshold for transmission lines. Second, there are 
security limits, which can be the limits in case there is forced outage on another line in 
the transmission network (normally using N-1 security limits). Voltage limits and 
stability limits can also contribute security limits.  
In order to maintain system reliability, the system operator has to check the 
transmission limits frequently. These transmission lmits have to be ensured when the 
system operator dispatch generators within the system to meet system demand, which is 
called security-constrained economic dispatch. The resulted power flow on transmission 
lines should not exceed their transmission limits. 
Since these special features of electricity systems have important effects on 
system and market operations, and behaviors of market partici nts (Berry 1999, Hobbs 
1999, Smeers and Jing-Yuan 1997, Cardell 1997), this dissertation incrporates the 
electric transmission network into the market efficien y and bidding behavior analysis, 
which is a major contribution of this research. DC power flow model is used to 
represent the transmission network in models proposed in this dissertation. The DC 
model, which is to be discussed in detail in section 3.2.1, retains reasonable fidelity to 
the physical properties of electric power system. In the simulation of the ERCOT real-
time market, the DC model captures the zonal congestion management process, which 
is to be discussed in 3.3.1 and 4.3.2. In section 4.4.1, the effects of the transmission 
network on the bidding behavior of market participants are discussed. 
1.3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
The objective of deregulation is to supply electricity efficiently resulting in 
lower electricity prices. In a perfectly competitive elctricity market, the market price 
should be the marginal cost of electricity production and competitive firms should bid 
their marginal costs to the markets. The rationale behind the empirical market analysis 
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is to estimate the prices that would result if no firm attempted to exercise market power, 
and to compare the estimated prices to the observed market pric s. This approach has 
been used to the market performance estimation (competitive benchmark analysis) and 
firm's activity analysis. 
1.3.1 Competitive benchmark analysis 
The competitive benchmark has become one of the fundament l metrics for 
market performance evaluation. The basic idea behind the competitive benchmark 
approach is to estimate the price that would result if no firm attempted to exercise 
market power based on engineering models of generation costs. Comparing the 
observed or actual market prices with the estimated competitive benchmark prices could 
indicate how close an actual market is to the perfectly competitive market.  
In the perfect competitive market, all firms are assumed to produce 
homogeneous, perfectly divisible output, and face no barriers to entry or exit; producers 
and consumers have full information, and no transaction c sts are incurred. In the 
absence of scarcity, marginal cost of production will be the equilibrium price of a 
competitive market. Even though perfect competition is rarely encountered in the real 
world, it provides a benchmark against which to compare markets with different 
structures. 
Mansur (2001) applied competitive benchmark analysis to the PJM market 
accounting for the unique features of the PJM market. He showed that market 
imperfections existed during the summer of 1999 in PJM and that a  least one firm in 
the PJM electricity market likely behaved in a non-competitiv  manner in setting prices.  
Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (1999) examined the degree of competition in 
the California market during June 1998 and September 1999. They found significant 
departures from competitive pricing during the highest demand period. However, no 
evidence of the exercise of market power was found for the winter and spring of 1999.  
Joskow and Kahn (2001) considered the prices of emission permits and imports 
of electricity from other states to the California market to estimate the competitive 
benchmark wholesale prices for electricity in the California electricity market during 
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the summer of 2000. They identified evidences of the exercise of market power during 
the highest priced hours of the summer. 
Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002) decomposed wholesale electricity 
payments into production costs, infra-marginal competitive rents, and payments 
resulting from the exercise of market power. Using data from June 1998 to October 
2000 for the California market, they found significant departures from the competitive 
pricing, particularly during the high-demand summer months. However, they did not 
consider the costs of transmission congestion or local reliability constraints in their 
estimates of the marginal cost of serving a given demand. 
Bushnell and Saravia (2002) estimated the performance of the New England 
market with the competitive benchmark approach. By comparing their results of the 
New England market to the results for the California and PJM electricity markets using 
similar approaches, they showed that the New England market had a more favorable 
performance than the California and the PJM markets from May 1999 to December 
1999.  
1.3.2 Firm’s activity analysis 
Empirical analysis of firm bidding strategies follows a similar rationale to the 
competitive benchmark approach by investigating the issues related to bid markups of 
firms in electricity markets. Empirical analysis of firms’ activity has been performed for 
several electricity markets.  
Wolfram (1998) analyzed the bidding behavior in the England and Wales 
market for six months of each year between 1992 and 1994. She focused on the 
relationship between bid markups and the generator’s infra-marginal capacity of the two 
big companies, National Power and PowerGen. She found increasing strategic bidding 
in the England and Wales market for the test period. 
Wolak (2000) presented a model of ex post profit-maximizing bidding behavior 
in electricity markets. Based on the submitted bids, the elasticity of the ex post residual 
demand curve faced by each supplier was evaluated at the mark t clearing price. The 
inverse of this ex post residual demand elasticity indicates how much bid markup could 
be reflected in offers. He demonstrated that a firm's ex post profit-maximizing bidding 
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strategy can be constructed by finding the optimal price and quantity pairs for all 
possible residual demand realizations under certain conditis. He also showed that the 
assumed ex post profit-maximizing behavior and the firm's margin l cost curve could be 
used to estimate the forward financial contract position of a supplier (Wolak (2002)). 
Wolak (2003) measured the unilateral incentives for each of t e ive largest electricity 
suppliers in the California to exercise market power during June 1 to September 30 of 
1998, 1999 and 2000. 
Puller (2001) analyzed the behavior of five generating firms in California from 
April 1998 to September 1999. He analyzed the market power of firms by measuring 
bid mark up directly or by the first order condition of static or dynamic Cournot models. 
In order to minimize the bias from operational constrain s, he chose data for one 
particular hour of each day that has the least operational effects for his analysis. By 
empirical analysis, he found firms exercise static market power during the test period. 
Hortacsu and Puller (2004) analyzed the behaviors of two big firms in ERCOT 
market by the ex post optimal bid strategy assumption, cosidering bilateral contracts. 
In order to avoid the complication posed by congestion, they focus on the un-congested 
6:00-7:00pm hour during the weekdays from September 2001 and July 2002. Through 
their empirical analysis, they found that the behavior of the firm with the highest stakes 
in the ERCOT market seems to fit the assumed ex-post optimality of observed bid 
functions. However, firms with smaller stakes in the market deviate from the ex-post 
optimal behavior. 
Corts (1999) mentioned that the parameterized static first-order condition could 
lead to inconsistent estimates of the conduct parameters if the true underlying process is 
not identical to the assumptions in the model. It is hard to explicitly estimate firms’ 
behavior, because a firm's bidding strategy is related to many factors, such as bilateral 
contracts, options, fuel markets, operation limits, and capacity limits. The cost of selling 
a unit of electricity can be greater than production cost if the firm has an opportunity 
cost that is greater than its production cost, such as te revenue the firm would get from 
selling power or reserve capacity in a different location or market, or environmental 
emission credit limits. 
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Most of these analyses avoid the complications of operational constraints, such 
as transmission constraints, by ignoring them or analyzing periods when the constraints 
are not binding on operation. In contrast, one of the goals f this dissertation is to 
develop analysis that incorporates the operational constrai ts. 
1.4 EQUILIBRIUM MODELS  
Although it is well recognized that no model can precisely predict the outcome 
in electricity markets, there appears to be an agreement that game theory models are 
indispensable for gaining insight on market participants’ possible behaviors and 
estimating possible market results of alternative market structures (Smeers (1997), 
Kahn (1998)).  
Game theory, introduced in 1944, analyzes the interactions between rational 
individuals who are interested in maximizing their profits. Even though all players 
know the structure of the game and that their opponents are rational, they may not be 
able to predict fully the outcomes of their decisions. Each player’s profit depends not 
only on its own actions but also on the actions of other players. The actions that are best 
for one player may depend on actions taken by other players, or will take, and even will 
not take, based on their current actions.  
Nash equilibrium is the most common concept used in game theory models 
applied in electricity markets (Ramos, Ventosa and River (1998), Moitre (2002)). Nash 
equilibrium specifies strategies with which competing firms mutually maximize their 
profits. In equilibrium, each player, if the strategies of all other players are held 
constant, will not gain a higher profit by choosing a different strategy. It is a 
mathematical technique for studying the likely result from the simultaneous behavior of 
many self-interested individuals, and for understanding possible trategies of rational 
players in deregulated electricity markets. 
1.4.1 Strategic interactions in equilibrium model 
The principal types of strategic interactions in game thory include: perfect 
competition, monopoly and oligopoly. For perfect competition, all firms produce 
homogeneous, perfectly divisible output and face no barriers to entry or exit. Producers 
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and consumers have full information, and no transaction costs incurred. In the absence 
of scarcity, marginal cost will be the equilibrium price. A firm is a monopoly if it is the 
only supplier of a product without a close substitute. A monop ly facing a downward-
sloping demand curve can set a price above marginal costs to maximize profits. There 
are two or more players in oligopoly games, which include non-cooperative and 
cooperative oligopoly. In a non-cooperative oligopoly, a small number of players act 
independently but are aware of one another's existence. In cooperative oligopolies, a 
small number of players coordinate their actions to maxi ize joint profits. Even without 
an explicit agreement, firms may coordinate their actions to maximize joint profits. 
There is an agreement among economists on the modeling of competition and 
monopoly. There is no such consensus on the modeling of non-cooperative oligopoly 
interactions. However, most economists agree about the basic characteristics of 
oligopoly games, which is that players produce homogeneous products and maximize 
their expected profit. The reason for the lack of agreement in non-cooperative oligopoly 
model is that a player must consider other players’ behavior to decide its best strategies. 
A monopolist does not need to consider other players, becaus  it is the only player in a 
market. For perfect competition, each individual competitiv  player is too small to 
affect the market price. Therefore, each player could reasonably ignore the actions of 
other players. In contrast, there are a few players in an oligopoly game. Each player 
knows that it can affect market price and hence its rivals' profit. 
The various oligopoly models differ in their assumptions about the type of 
actions players may take (such as set prices or set outputs), the order in which they may 
take actions (such as which firm makes decision first), and the length of the game (one-
period model or multi-period model). Three best-known oligopoly models in industry 
organization are Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg models. Players in the Cournot and 
Stackelberg models set their output levels, whereas they set prices in Bertrand models. 
All the players act simultaneously in the Cournot and Bertrand models. In Stackelberg 
models, one player sets its output level before the others. As the number of players in 
the market increases, the Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium become closer to the 
perfect competitive result. However, the Bertrand equilibrium is unaffected by the 
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number of firms. As long as the market has at least two players with unlimited capacity, 
the Bertrand equilibrium is the same as the perfect competitive optimum. 
In addition to those three oligopoly models, Klemperer and Meyer (1989) 
developed the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) model to analyze profit-maximizing 
equilibrium in a marketplace with uncertain demand. In SFE models, players decide 
price and quantity functions (supply functions) simultaneously rather than simply set 
prices or output quantities as in the above Bertrand, Cournot, and Stackelberg models. 
The equilibrium price of SFE models lies between the Bertrand and Cournot 
equilibrium prices. 
1.4.2 Applications of equilibrium models 
All of the above equilibrium models have been applied to analyze the 
interactions between competing generating firms in electricity markets. Most models 
implicitly or explicitly assume a pool electricity market in their studies, where 
generating firms bid most of their capacity to the market and the Independent System 
Operator (ISO) dispatches the generators within the system based on their bids to meet 
the load demand.  
A collusion game was presented in a price limiting game (Hobbs (1985)) and a 
cooperative Nash bargaining game (Bai (1997)). Berry, Hobbs, and Meroney (1999) 
examined the perfect competition, oligopoly competition, a d monopoly competition in 
a power pool system considering transmission network to analyze the effects of network 
structure on market result. Hobbs (1985) presented a Bertrand model and showed that 
price falls to marginal cost if there is no capacity l mit and transmission cost. The 
Stackelberg model was used to analyzing the interactions between large suppliers and 
the smaller suppliers (Hobbs (2000)). In 2001, Hobbs also presented two Cournot 
models to analyze bilateral markets. Cunningham, Baldick, and Baughman (2002) 
formulated a Cournot model to analyze the restructured ERCOT market and showed 
there is no equilibrium when there is transmission cgestion for their equivalent 
example system. The approaches to mitigate the market power related to Transmission 
Congestion Rights (TCRs) are discussed with Cournot models in (Olmos and Neuhoff 
(2004), Gilbert, Neuhoff, and Newberry (2002)). 
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Although Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg models are widely applied to the 
restructured electricity markets, the appropriateness of the assumptions of these models 
for electricity markets have been challenged. In electricity markets, every firm offers a 
price and quantity schedule (supply function), not a price or quantity, for each of its 
generator or entire output simultaneously to the market operator. The SFE model 
initiated by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) reflects these price and quantity schedule in 
their assumption. Market participants submit a price and quantity function (supply or 
bid function) in the SFE model. At SFE, no player wants to unilaterally change its 
supply function in order to maximize its profit. The decision variables are the 
parameters of the supply function, rather than simple quantity or price as in the Cournot, 
Bertrand and Stackelberg models. Therefore, from the aspect of bid rules of electricity 
markets, SFE model offer a more realistic view of electricity markets. 
 In addition to offering a more realistic view of electrici y markets, the SFE 
model has the strength that it depends less on the specification of demand curve than the 
widely used Cournot models. In Cournot models, the market price is determined by the 
intersection of the aggregate quantity offered by all market players and their residual 
demand curve. If the residual demand elasticity is zero, there will be no solution for 
Cournot models. Therefore, demand elasticity or a competitive fringe is critical and 
necessary for the solution of Counot modes. However, th short-run demand elasticity 
in electricity market is almost zero, and it is difficult to specify the market demand 
curve. As a result, price predictions from Cournot models pend on assumptions about 
a competitive fringe and are not very reliable. Frame and Joskow (1998) mentioned that 
they are not aware of any significant empirical support for he Cournot model providing 
accurate predictions of prices in an electricity market.  
In contrast, neither demand elasticity nor a competitiv  fringe is necessary for 
the existence of SFE equilibrium. The price and quantity supply functions from players 
creates elasticity of the residual demand faced by each pl yer. Therefore, the existence 
of equilibrium in SFE model does not require the system demand to be elastic, and SFE 
models can deal with the zero demand elasticity case. Th  price predictions from SFE 
models are generally sensible, which represents an intermediate level of competition, 
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lying between the Bertrand and Cournot results. In applying SFE models to England 
and Wales electricity market (Green & Newbery (1992), Baldick, Grand, and Kahn 
(2004)) shows that SFE models could predict prices that match the empirical data 
reasonably. 
The above merits of SFE models have attracted many researchers to apply them 
to the analysis of various issues in electricity markets, including the impact of strategic 
behavior, market divesture, long-term contracts, and impacts of transmission network 
on electricity prices. Green and Newbery (1992) firstly applied the SFE model to the 
England and Wales electricity market to investigate how divestiture will affect the 
market outcome. Their publication attracted a substantial i erest to the SFE model both 
in the industry and in academia. Newbery (1998) and Green (1999) explored the effects 
of contract market on the equilibrium with SFE models. Rudkevich (1999) presented an 
SFE model to analyze the ability of players to adapt their behavior through market 
observations. Bohn, Klevorick, and Stalon (1999) tried to use an SFE model to gain 
insights into the bidding behavior of firms in the California Power Exchange. Ilic 
(1998) and Berry, Hobbs and Meroney (1999) examined how the network structure 
affects the competition with an SFE model. Rudkevich (2002) offered an SFE model to 
find the effects of different payment rules ranging from the one-price to the pay-as-bid 
market design. Baldick (2001) examined the interaction of capa ity constraints, price 
caps, and the length of the time horizon over which bids mu t remain unchanged. 
Although the SFE model represents the bid rules of electricity markets more 
realistically, at the same time this realism also brings difficulty to calculate equilibrium. 
The challenge to solve SFE models is caused by the non-convexity of the optimization 
problem faced by each firm. Without restrictive assumptions n the SFE models (which 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4) and powerful algorithms, it is very difficult to 
find equilibrium. Even though the approach for solving coupled differential equations 
(Klemperer and Meyer (1989)) has been used successfully by (Green and Newbery 
(1992)) and (Green (1996)), they always involve symmetric o  asymmetric duopoly 
cases. In markets with asymmetric multiple players and capacity constraints, the 
differential equation approach may not be effective because the solution typically 
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violates the non-decreasing constraints (Baldick and Hogan (2002)). Even when the 
differential equation approach yields solutions that satisfy the non-decreasing 
constraints, many of the equilibriums are unstable (Baldick and Hogan (2002)). Since 
the asymmetric and multiple player cases are more interesting in practice, an iterative 
numerical approach (Berry (1999)) was developed.  
Normally, the iterative procedure starts by solving the profit-maximizing 
problem of one player in its feasible supply functions space by arbitrarily fixing the 
supply functions of other players. After the optimal supply function for the considered 
player is found, it is fixed and the procedure is repeated for the next player. The process 
continues until no player wants to change its supply function in order to maximize its 
profit. There is no guarantee that the iterative approach will converge. However, the 
applications of this approach showed that it could produce consiste t and useful results 
(Berry, Hobbs (1999), Hobbs, Carolyn and pang (2000), Day (2001), Baldick and 
Hogan (2002)). 
Iterative procedures have also been used to find the equilibrium with 
transmission constraints. The system ISO market-clearing procedure based on the 
network model is imbedded in the profit-maximizing problem for each player. Then, 
electricity market prices depend not only on economic principles, but also on Kirchoff’s 
laws. Borenstein, Bushnell, and Stoft (2000), Cunningham, Baldick, and Baughman 
(2002), Younes and Ilic (1998), and Oren (1997) showed that transmission constraints 
could encourage strategic behavior from participants to increase profits, and have 
important effects on the equilibrium solution in electricity market.  
SFE models with transmission constraints provide useful tools to study 
oligopoly games in the complicated electricity transmission networks. However, the 
SFE models with transmission constraints are usually computationally challenging. The 
transmission congestion exacerbates the non-convexity problem of player’s 
optimization problem. Algorithms are usually exposed to the problems of non-existence 
of equilibrium or multiple equilibriums. Borenstein, Bushnell, and Stoft (2000) and 
Cunningham, Baldick, and Baughman (2002) showed that transmission constraints 
could disrupt a pure equilibrium and no pure strategy equilibrium exists for their cases 
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because of congestion. Hobbs, Metzler, and Pang (2000) observed that there are likely 
to be multiple equilibriums if multiple players can choose intercept and slope 
arbitrarily. 
In order to facilitate the finding of equilibrium, many approaches involve 
restriction on the parameter of the linear supply functio  for SFE models with 
transmission congestion in order to guarantee a unique SFE, (Green (1996)), Berry, 
Hobbs and Meroney (1999) assumed that player could only manipulte the intercept, or 
the slope of the linear supply function (Green (1996)). Younes and Ilic(1998), Weber 
and Overbye (1999) assumed that the slope and the intercept of the linear supply 
function have a fixed linear relationship.  
Baldick (2002) demonstrate that these artificial assumptions in the 
parameterization of the supply function model have a significant effect on the calculated 
results for the single pricing-period case. Whether or not pure strategy equilibrium 
exists can also depend on assumptions about the parameterization of the supply 
functions. He also mentioned that fixed slope SFE model could be appropriate for a 
multiple pricing-period market where each player must bid same function for several 
pricing periods. 
To summarize, SFE models have become a good tool to understand how market 
power could be exercised in the actual electricity market and estimate the possible result 
from market power.  Such an understanding is critical for the development of an 
efficient market power mitigation procedure. Without an effective market power 
mitigation procedure, the competition of electricity markets could not be assured 
because of their vulnerability to market power abuse. In this context, SFE models are 
valuable for a good electricity market design.  
Despite the difficulties faced by SFE models, the empirical applications of SFE 
models to the England and Wales market (Green, Newbery (1992), Green (1996, 1999), 
Day (2001), Baldick (2001, 2004)) and the California market (Bohn, Klevorick, and 
Stalon (1999)) did show their usefulness to understand the mechanisms that market 
power could be excised and the possible results that market power could bring to the 
markets. 
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Since electricity transmission network can have important effects on the 
equilibrium solution in electricity market, it is important to address the engineering 
characteristics to the electricity market analysis. There are two approaches to 
incorporate transmission effects in an approximate manner. One is known as a 
transportation model, and the other one is DC load flowmodel. The basic difference 
between them is whether flow over links of electric ansmission system is dependent 
with each other. The transportation model neglects all electrical characteristics of the 
transmission network except for capacity limits. This brings a substantial reduction in 
the computation of the problem, at the cost of being less accurate. The DC model 
retains reasonable fidelity to electrical properties. DC power flow model has been used 
in the literatures (Berry (1999), Hobbs (1999), Smeers and Jing-Yuan (1997), Cardell 
(1997)). 
Harvey and Hogan (2002) emphasize that high wholesale electricity prices do 
not necessarily indicate market power. High cost, increased demand, capacity 
constraints, and shortages can also be the reasons. They also emphasize the importance 
of sensitivity analysis in the simulation approach to avoid errors in simulation models. 
If the sensitivity analysis reveals relatively small changes in the estimated market 
prices, the errors may not be important. 
In the market efficiency analysis models proposed in this dis ertation, capacity 
constraints and transmission constraints are considered. The effects of transmission 
constraints and operational constraints on market prices based on the actual bids are 
also analyzed. Transmission network is also incorporated in the SFE bidding strategy 
simulation model. Sensitivity is discussed in section 4.4.1 for the bidding strategy 
simulation model proposed. We show that the simulation results are not sensitive to the 
assumptions for the models.  
1.5 IMPORTANCE AND CONTRIBUTIONS  
As we discussed above, a perfectly competitive market dos not exist in 
practice. Many issues can contribute to the electricity market inefficiency, such as 
market design flaws, market power abuse, and inherent engineering features of power 
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system operations. Underlying the growing debates over the appropriate organization of 
the electricity industry, there is a critical need for the performance evaluation of the 
electricity markets that are already operating and understanding the behaviors of market 
participants.  
Models for electricity market efficiency and bidding strategy analysis are 
developed in this dissertation based on competitive benchmark odel and supply 
function equilibrium model representing transmission constraints. Competitive 
benchmark analysis is an approach to evaluate the performance of electricity markets by 
estimating how much the actual market prices deviate from the perfect competitive 
benchmark prices based on actual generation costs or cost estimates. Although perfect 
competition is rarely encountered in the real world, it provides a benchmark against 
which to compare various markets having different structures. Since some 
characteristics of electricity markets facilitate the exercise of market power, market 
power analysis has received attention in both theory and practice. Game theory has been 
used to analyze the market power or bidding strategy issues.  
For the electricity market efficiency analysis, a competitive benchmark model 
with transmission and operational constraints is developed in this dissertation to 
estimate the competitive benchmark prices. Two more models ar  developed to estimate 
the effects of transmission and operational constraints o  market efficiency based on the 
submitted bids. The research contributes to the literature in three aspects. First, 
transmission and operational constraints are considered in the competitive benchmark 
estimation model, which is neglected in most empirical literature. In reality, 
transmission and operational constraints affect the competitive benchmark even if the 
suppliers and buyers truthfully reveal their marginal cost and demand functions. 
Second, the effects of operational and transmission constraints on market prices are 
estimated through two models based on the submitted bids of market participants. 
Third, these models are applied to analyze efficiency of the ERCOT real-time energy 
market by simulating the market from January 2002 to April 2003, considering the 
characteristics and available information for the ERCOT market. ERCOT is 
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undertaking a market redesign rulemaking process. Evaluation of the performance of its 
current market is helpful for this policy process.  
For the bidding behavior analysis, a linear asymmetric SFE model with 
transmission constraints is proposed to analyze the bidding strategies with forward 
contracts. In electricity markets, electric firms compete through both spot market 
bidding and bilateral contract trading. Firms have to consider their forward contract 
positions when they make their spot market decisions. The model contributes to the 
literature in several aspects. First, we combine forward contracts, transmission 
constraints and multi-period strategy (an obligation for firms to bid consistently over an 
extended time horizon such as a day or an hour) into the linear asymmetric SFE 
framework. As an ex-ante model, it can provide qualitative insights into firms’ 
behaviors. Second, the bidding strategies related to Transmission Congestion Rights 
(TCRs) are discussed by interpreting TCRs as a linear combination of forwards. Third, 
the model is a general one in the sense that there is no limitation on the number of firms 
and scale of the transmission network, which can have asymmetric linear marginal cost 
structures. In addition to theoretical analysis, we apply our model to simulate the 
bidding behaviors in the ERCOT real-time balancing energy market from January 2002 
to April 2003. Most applications of oligopoly models in electricity markets focus on 
contract markets or day-ahead pool markets. Our model shows that real-time market 
analysis is also valuable even when it is relatively small in trading quantity.  
The research performed in this dissertation is valuable for the ERCOT market. 
The ERCOT market differs from the FERC’s SMD and from ther electricity markets 
in many aspects. Some of the findings in other restructured markets may not be suitable 
for the ERCOT market reality. Further more, ERCOT is currently undertaking a market 
redesign rulemaking process. Understanding the performance of its current market and 
behaviors of market participants are very important and instructive for this policy 
process. Because of the short history of the ERCOT market (began on July 31, 2001), 
not much systematic analysis has been done for this market, compared with the research 
about the PJM or California market.  
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As an efficiency analysis of the ERCOT market over time duration of more than 
one year, this research provides policymakers a vision of the market performance, the 
effects of operational and transmission constraints on market results, and characteristics 
of bidding behaviors of market participants. Another potential value of this research is 
for energy companies. The efficiency analysis enables market participants to know how 
well the market works. The SFE models enable them to understand the possible 
behaviors they or their competitors can take and the motivations behind those 
behaviors. Such understandings are helpful for market partici nts to make better 
business decisions within the ERCOT market framework. 
Although ERCOT is going to change its market design in the future, the 
proposed general theoretical framework are applicable to the market analysis with 
different market structure, including the market structure hat the ERCOT market will 
possibly head to and the transitional period from current market structure to the new 
market structure. The proposed models can also be extended to study other issues 
important in electricity markets, such as unit commitment, market power related to 
transmission congestion (ownership of transmission congestion rights) or operational 
constraints, relationship between the day-ahead market and he real-time market, and 
the effects of different contract level on the spot market.  
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the history and 
the market structure of the ERCOT electricity market based on (Baldick and Niu 
(2004)). The models for competitive benchmark with transmision constraints and the 
effects of transmission and operational constraints are presented in Chapter 3. The 
application of these models to analyze the ERCOT real-time market is also performed 
and discussed in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the asymmetric linear SFE model with 
forward contracts is constructed. The application of this model to the ERCOT real-time 
energy market is also presented in Chapter 4. The dissertation concludes in Chapter 5 
with some suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2:  THE ERCOT MARKET  
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
Officially founded in 1970, ERCOT is one of the ten regional reliability councils 
in North America operating under the reliability and safety standards set by the North 
American Electric Reliability Council (NERC). Figure 2.1 (Source: www.nerc.com) 
shows the regions of the ten reliability councils of NERC2 and shows that the ERCOT 
system covers most of the geographical area of Texas. As a NERC member, ERCOT's 
primary responsibility is to facilitate reliable power g id operations in the ERCOT 
system by working with the region's electric utility industry organizations. The board of 
directors comprised of market participants with three independent members governs 
ERCOT. 
Figure 2.1:  Regional Reliability Councils of NERC 
                                               
2 The regions are: East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement (ECAR), Electric Reliability 
Council of Texas (ERCOT), Florida Reliability Coordinating Council (FRCC), Mid-Atlantic Area 
Council (MAAC), Mid-America Interconnected Network (MAIN), Mid-Continent Area Power Pool 
(MAPP), Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC), Southeastern Electric Reliability Council 
(SERC), Southwest Power Pool (SPP) and Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC). 
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Because ERCOT is entirely within the state boundaries of Texas, the production 
and sale of electricity in ERCOT is not subject to the regulation by FERC, but instead 
falls exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Public Utility Commission of Texas 
(PUCT) with laws established by the Texas Legislature. Th  jurisdictional arrangement 
for ERCOT is unlike the case in the other lower 47 state  where jurisdiction is split 
between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and state public utility or 
public service commissions. 
In 1995, the Texas Legislature amended the Public Utility Regulatory Act 
(PURA) to restructure the wholesale generation market. In 1996, ERCOT was 
authorized by the PUCT to operate as a not-for-profit Independent System Operator 
(ISO) to facilitate the efficient use of the electri transmission system by all market 
participants. In its initial operation, the ERCOT ISO did not fulfill all the functions 
specified in FERC Order 888 (FERC (1996)). In particular, the ERCOT ISO was not the 
“control area operator” for ERCOT. 
On May 21, 1999, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 7(SB ) (PUCT, 
1999). Under SB7, the ERCOT ISO was given the responsibility to develop the market 
structure, infrastructure, and business processes to facilitate retail competition in Texas. 
During 1999 and 2000, the ERCOT ISO and market participants developed “Protocols,” 
which are rules and standards that the ERCOT ISO uses to implement its market 
functions. The PUCT approved the market rules of the Texas wholesale electricity 
market (ERCOT protocols) on June 4, 2001 and the ERCOT market began to operate as 
a single “control area” under the ERCOT ISO on July 31, 2001. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 is an overview 
of ERCOT generation resources and market participants. The structure of the ERCOT 
market is presented in Section 2.3, including the major components of the market, 
transmission congestion management. 
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2.2 MARKET OVERVIEW  
The ERCOT ISO serves approximately 85 percent of the Texas state's electric 
load, and oversees the operation of approximately 77,000 megawatts of generation 
connected by about 37,000 miles of transmission lines over 200,000 square miles area.  
2.2.1 Capacity Adequacy 
In order to meet reliability criteria, there must be adequate installed capacity.  
During the eight years between the introduction of wholesale competition to ERCOT in 
1995 and early 2003, generation capacity in ERCOT has increased by 30%, while the 
peak demand increased about 20%. That is, there is currently a large amount of 
generation capacity relative to demand in ERCOT. Over this period, the installed 
capacity increased from 59,000 MW to 77,000 MW, while peak demand increased from 
46,668 MW to 55,703 MW. (The highest ERCOT peak demand was recorded at 60,059 
MW in August 2003).  
The “reserve margin” is used to characterize capacity adequacy and is defined as 
the difference between total electricity generation capa ity and peak demand, divided 
by the peak demand. The ERCOT ISO periodically determines the minimum reserve 
margin required to ensure the adequacy of installed generation capability.  ERCOT 
utilities have traditionally been required to maintain a reserve margin of 15%.  
Based on the NERC report “Summer Assessment of Reliability of Bulk 
Electricity Supply in North America” (NERC (2003)), the summer Available Resources, 
the Projected Peak Demand, and actual peak demands (ERCOT (2002a)) in ERCOT 
from 1996 to 2003 are summarized in Table 2.1. “Available Resources” in Table 2.1 are 
defined to be the existing generation capacity plus new units scheduled for service by 
the given summer peak month and year, plus the differenc  between firm capacity 
purchases and sales, less existing capacity that is unavailable due to planned outages. 
The projected peak demand is the projected peak-hour demand for the given summer 
peak month and given year, including standby demand, less th um of direct control 
load management (monthly coincident) and interruptible demands. ERCOT predicts a 
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reserve margin of 21.6% in 2004, 18.3% in 2005, and 16.1% in 2006, and 13.6% in 
2007.  
Table 2.1:  Reserve Margins of ERCOT 
Year (MW) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Available Resources 56,147 56,446 57,226 57,860 61,751 65,064 75,600 77,563 
Projected Peak Load 45,497 46,348 47,808 50,479 52,152 53,391 57,761 57,664 
Actual Peak Load 47,683 50,150 53,689 54,849 57,606 55,201 55,703 60,157 
Projected Reserve Margin 18.97% 17.89% 16.46% 12.76% 15.54% 17.94% 23.60% 25.66% 
Actual Reserve Margin 15.07% 11.15% 6.18% 5.20% 6.71% 15.16% 26.32% 22.44% 
 
2.2.2 Market Participants 
SB7 introduced competition to the retail sale of electricity in Texas. Each 
Investor-owned electric utility (IOU) was required to be unbundled into three distinct 
kinds of companies: a power generation company (PGC), a transmission and 
distribution service provider (TDSP), and a retail electric p ovider (REP). PGCs operate 
as wholesale providers of generation services. REPs operate as retail providers of 
electricity. The TDSPs remain regulated by PUCT, and are required to provide non-
discriminatory access to the transmission and distribution grid.  The PUCT sets the rates 
for transmission and distribution service.  
SB7 allows retail customers of IOUs to select their electricity provider since 
January 1, 2002. Municipally owned utilities (MOUs) and electric cooperatives (Co-
Ops) were granted the option to decide whether and when to open their service areas to 
retail competition under the so-called opt-in or non-opt-in provision. They are allowed 
to continue bundled operations regardless of their choice to open their service areas to 
retail competition.  
“Resources” in ERCOT represent entities that are able to meet system demand. 
A Resource can be a PGC, a Qualifying Facility (QF), a MOU, a Co-Op, an 
Independent Power Producer (IPP), and a Load Serving Entity (LSE) or a particular 
load acting as a resource (LaaR). A PGC is the entity registered by the PUCT to 
generate and sell electricity at wholesale. QFs are a category of cogeneration or small 
power generating facility that meets certain criteria stablished by the FERC. IPPs are 
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non-utility power generators that are not regulated utilities, government agencies, nor 
the certified as QFs. LSEs are entities that provide electric service to customers, which 
include REPs, Competitive Retailers (CRs), and Non-Opt-In Entities (NOIEs). The 
plethora of categories of Generation Resources and of LSEs reflects the co-existence of 
grandfather entities with restructured IOUs and with newentities such as CRs. 
The matching between generation resources and LSEs constitutes a “schedule.” 
Market participants are required to submit their schedules of nergy to the ERCOT ISO 
through Qualified Scheduling Entities (QSEs). QSEs are qualified by the ERCOT ISO 
in accordance with the Protocol to submit schedules and ancillary services bids and 
settle payments with the ERCOT ISO for the entities in their portfolio. The schedule 
process will be discussed in detail at Section 2.3. 
Figure 2.2:  Overview of ERCOT Market Participants 
As of early 2003, there are 46 QSEs, 52 CRs, 153 aggregators, 16 REPs, 17 
power marketers, 37 electric cooperatives, 16 municipally owned utilities, 8 investor-
owned utilities, and 5 IPPs (PUCT (2003c), ERCOT (2003b)). Figure 2.2 (Source: 
ERCOT (2001)) shows the relationship between major market participants in the 
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shows “power marketers” and “aggregators.”  A power markete does not own 
generation, transmission, or distribution facilities in Texas, and does not have a certified 
service area, but has been granted to sell electric energy at market-based rates. 
Aggregators join two or more customers into a single purchasing unit to negotiate the 
purchase of electricity from retail electric providers.  
2.3 MARKET STRUCTURE  
The current ERCOT market is different from the FERC’s SMD and from other 
electricity markets at U.S. in many aspects. Most of other restructured markets have 
both a day-ahead centrally dispatched energy pool and a real-time energy market. 
However, the current ERCOT market does not have a day-ahead energy pool market. 
There is only a real time balancing energy service (BES) market. ERCOT has a day-
ahead portfolio energy schedule process. Table 2.2 compares the current ERCOT 
market with other US electricity markets (Source: PUCT, 2003b).  
Table 2.2:  Market Structure Comparison 
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Note:  ICAP refers to Installed Capacity market when rsource owners are paid additional money for 
offering their capacity.  AMP refers to Automated Mitigaon Procedure used in some U.S. markets to 
mitigate offer prices. 
 
In the following subsections, we describe the components of the ERCOT market 
from the following perspectives: bilateral contract market, balancing energy market, 
congestion management, transmission congestion rights, and ancillary services market. 
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2.3.1 Bilateral Contract Market 
Electricity markets that have both a day-ahead centrally dispatched energy 
market and a real-time market include the (now defunct) California PX, California 
MD02, the England and Wales market prior to March 2001, and the two markets in the 
Northeastern United States, New York and New England markets. In these markets, 
bilateral transactions between generation and demand are essentially “financial” in 
nature that the actual dispatch is decided by the pool rather than specified by the 
bilateral contracts.  The role of bilateral contracts in these markets is to financially 
hedge against pool price variation. 
Unlike the pool markets, the ERCOT wholesale market only has a day-ahead 
portfolio energy schedule process. The schedules in ERCOT indicate the matching of 
generation resources with LSEs demand. LSEs forecast their customers’ load and 
negotiate privately with generation resources or power marketers to buy energy for their 
customers. Forward contracts between LSEs and generation resources or power 
marketers are typically incorporated in their schedules.  
The schedules represent the about 95% to 97% of delivered energy in the 
ERCOT. Therefore, bilateral transactions represent the bulk of delivered energy in the 
ERCOT system. The ERCOT ISO only dispatches the deviation of energy and load 
from their schedules. Therefore, if a QSE perfectly reflects its actual resources, load, 
and forward contracts in its schedule, they could minimize their exposure to the BES 
market by locking in their forward contracts. In contrast to the financial bilateral 
transactions in pool markets, the bilateral transactions n ERCOT have a “physical” 
flavor in that, in principle, a bilateral transaction that is scheduled by a QSE is expected 
to occur. 
Market participants in ERCOT are required to submit their schedules to the 
ERCOT ISO by QSEs. QSEs initially were required to submit a balanced schedule 
where scheduled generation should equal the scheduled load based on their load 
forecast. In November 2002, “relaxed balanced scheduling” was implemented on a trial 
basis, under which QSEs are not anymore expected to schedule demand equal to their 
load forecast. After an REP bankruptcy due to the high BESprices in February 2003, 
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the allowable deviation between the schedules and load forecast is limited since April 
2003 unless additional credit is posted by the QSE in question. 
2.3.2 Balancing Energy Market 
The current ERCOT market design reflects the philosophy of minimizing the 
involvement of the ISO (min-ISO) in the electricity market, where the ISO just operates 
a residual market or a “net pool” (Hogan (1995)).  The ERCOT ISO is only involved in 
the transaction of the imbalances between actual conditi s and schedules, and in 
clearing congestion and taking other actions to maintain system reliability. A balancing 
market is necessary because energy supply and demand must be balanced continuously 
since electrical energy cannot be cheaply stored. About 3% o 5% of the total energy is 
transacted through the balancing energy market operated by the ERCOT ISO.  
According to the ERCOT market guide (ERCOT (2001)), the market operations 
process contains three major periods: day-ahead Ancillary Services (AS) markets, 
adjustment period, and operating period. The day-ahead AS market occurs from 
6:00AM to 6:00PM on the day prior to the operating day. QSEs submit portfolio 
schedules and ancillary services bids day-ahead. The adjustment period happens 
between the close of day-ahead AS markets and one hour prir to the operating hour 
(the current clock hour). QSEs may adjust their schedules, BES bids, and update their 
resource plans during this period. By the end of the adjustment period, ERCOT receives 
final bids for balancing energy up (BEU) and balancing energy down (BED). The 
operating period includes the operating hour and the hour prior to the operating hour. 
The ERCOT ISO clears the BES market every 15 minutes based on the hourly 
BES bids and schedules submitted by QSEs to keep system balance and flows on the 
inter-zonal constraints within their transmission capacities. BES bids include BEU and 
BED bids, specified by congestion zone with monotonically increasing ordered pairs of 
prices and cumulative megawatts ($/MWh, MW). The bid caps re $1,000/MWh for 
BEU and –$1,000/MWh for BED. As well as the above zonal portfolio level BES bids, 
QSEs can also voluntarily submit their resource specific premium bids to help solving 
local reliability issues. Resource specific premiums include price premium at which a 
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resource will increase or decrease its operation level from its current operating point 
and unit specific dispatchable range. 
Settlements of the balancing energy are based on the zonal aggregate load 
imbalance and resource imbalance for each QSE. The load imbalance is the difference 
between the scheduled load and actual load from each QSE, while the resource 
imbalance is the difference between the scheduled generation and actual generation for 
each QSE. The actual load and generation amounts are derived f om the load and 
resource meter readings. 
2.3.3 Congestion Management 
If the scheduled power on transmission elements is expected to exceed their 
transfer capability, called congestion, the ISO has to re-dispatch resources to relieve 
congestion and balance system at the same time. Prior to June 2004, ERCOT used a 
two-step zonal congestion management scheme.  
The ERCOT ISO categorizes congestion as either inter-zonal congestion or local 
congestion. The transmission grid, including generation resources and loads, is divided 
into several congestion zones determined annually. Each congestion zone is defined 
such that each generation resource or load within the zone is assumed to have a similar 
effect (characterized by its “shift factor”) on the transmission facilities between 
congestion zones, called Commercially Significant Constraints (CSCs). The congestion 
on CSCs or predefined Closely Related Elements (CRE) is called inter-zonal congestion 
or CSC congestion. The congestion occur on other transmission elements are called 
local congestion.  
ERCOT re-assesses CSCs annually, based on the changes of the system 
topology. New congestion zones may be identified based on the re-assessed CSCs. In 
2001, there were three congestion zones in ERCOT: North Zne, South Zone and West 
Zone, and two CSCs: transmission from Graham to Parker (W st to North) and from 
Limestone to Watermill (South to North). There were four congestion zones for 2002 
and 2003: North Zone, South Zone, West Zone and Houston Zone. The transmission 
from Sandow to Temple (South to North), Graham to Parker (West to North), STP to 
DOW (South to Houston), and Parker to Graham (North to West) were the CSCs for 
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2002. There were only three CSCs in 2003, involving transmission from STP to Dow 
(South to Houston), from Graham to Parker (West to North) and from Sandow to 
Temple (South to North). The CSCs and congestion zones f ERCOT in 2003 are 
shown in Figure 2.3 (Source: ERCOT (2002a)). 
Figure 2.3:  CSCs of ERCOT in 2003 
In the two-step congestion management process, the ERCOT IS  manages the 
CSC congestion first. The Market Clearing Price of Energy (MCPE) is determined for 
each zone based on the zonal portfolio BES bids, and CSC transmission limits. Zonal 
generation-weighted average shift factors, are used as an pproximation to the actual 
shift factors of each generation unit within the zone to manage congestion on CSCs. 
Therefore, generators are exposed to locational prices that reflect the average effect of 
location in zones on CSCs. When only transmission congestion on CSCs needs to be 
managed within the ERCOT region, only portfolio instructions are issued on a zonal 
basis. These zonal instructions are settled based on MCPEs.  
If there is local congestion, ERCOT ISO relies on a more detailed operational 
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relieve local congestion in the second step. The unit specific deployments are settled 
based on unit specific bids or out of merit price set by protocols, rather than by MCPEs, 
The cost of relieving local congestion is uplifted to each QSE based on its Load Ratio 
Share (LRS)3. 
2.3.4 Transmission Congestion Rights 
When ERCOT began operation as a single “control area” on July 31, 2001, 
inter-zonal congestion re-dispatch costs were uplifted among market participants on a 
“load ratio share” basis. This presented an opportunity for pr fiting by over-scheduling 
and then being paid to relieve congestion, which is similar to the “Inc and Dec” game in 
the California market. Serious over-scheduling was observed in the first month of single 
control area operation in August 2001.  
The potential for this problem was anticipated (Oren (2001)). The PUCT 
required ERCOT to switch to a “direct assignment” methodol gy (that is, charging 
zonal congestion rents) by January 1, 2003 or six months after inter-zonal re-dispatch 
costs rose above $20 million on a rolling twelve-month period, whichever came first. It 
also required ERCOT to implement a system of transmission congestion rights (TCRs), 
which would allow market participants to hedge their inter-zonal congestion charges.  
The $20 million threshold for inter-zonal re-dispatch costs was reached on 
August 15, 2001, just 15 days after beginning of the operation as a single control area. 
“Direct assignment” and the TCR system were implemented on February 15, 2002. 
Under direct assignment, the charge or payment to a QSE is based on the product of its 
scheduled flow and shadow prices on the congested CSCs. That is, a QSE is exposed to 
the variation of the shadow price for the CSC.  
Figure 2.4 shows the monthly zonal re-dispatch costs (until February 14, 2002) 
and congestion rent (after February 15, 2002) in ERCOT. Zonal congestion rent after 
February 15, 2002 was significantly less than the re-dispatch cost prior to February 15, 
2002.  This strongly suggests that significant over-scheduling was taking place prior to 
February 15, 2002. Over-scheduling across the CSCs has stopped and should not re-
                                               
3ERCOT implemented three-step congestion management process in June 2004, which relies on BES 
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occur because the change to direct assignment of zonal congestion rent removed the 


























































































 Figure 2.4:  CSC Congestion Costs 
Transmission Congestion Rights (TCRs) and Pre-assigned Congestion Rights 
(PCRs) were implemented as financial hedges against the CSC congestion rents. TCRs 
are awarded in yearly and monthly simultaneous combinatorial auctions based on the 
auction clearing prices. PCRs are allocated to MOUs and Co-Ops rather than awarded 
by the TCR auction process and are priced significantly lower than prices charged for 
TCRs. For all other purposes, PCRs are functionally and financially equivalent to 
TCRs.  
MOUs and Co-Ops that made a long-term (greater than five years) contractual 
commitment for annual capacity or energy from a specific remote generation resource 
prior to September 1, 1999, are eligible for PCRs between the zone of their resource and 
the zone of their demand.  PCRs are available on an annual basis until the date upon 
which an MOU or Co-Op implements retail customer choice, or alternatively, until such 
other date as may be specified by Order of the PUCT. The cost of PCRs equals fifteen 
                                                                                                                               
market rather than OOM services for local congestion.  
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percent of the applicable annual TCR auction clearing price for ach CSC for which a 
PCR is allocated.  PCRs may be traded in the secondary m rket. Holders of PCRs are 
not precluded from participating in the market to purchase additional TCRs. 
The ERCOT ISO initially conducted a simple, single round TCR auction for 
each CSC. However, TCRs for various CSCs are closely inter-related products. Having 
separate markets for them poses difficulties for achieving efficiency. To respond to this 
issue, the Congestion Management Working Group of the Wholesale Market 
Subcommittee drafted Protocol Revision Request (PRR) 329 in May 2002 to implement 
the PUCT order to convert the simple auction to a combinatorial auction of TCRs. This 
PRR was approved on May 9, 2002, and it became effective on January 1, 2003. By this 
revision, the ERCOT ISO conduct a single-round, simultaneous combinatorial auction 
for selling the TCRs available for each annual or monthly auction for all CSCs.  In this 
auction, bidders can reflect their needs for TCRs on multiple CSCs simultaneously. The 
clearing-price for each TCR equals to the corresponding shadow price of the marginal 
TCR awarded on that CSC.  
Under some circumstances, PCRs and TCRs have the potential to enhance 
market power (Oren (1997), Joskow (2000)). As an ad hoc approach to mitigating 
market power in ERCOT, no entity combined with its affili tes may, directly or 
indirectly, own, control, or receive the revenue from more than 25% of the total 
available TCRs at a particular CSC interface for any si gle direction and a given hour. 
2.3.5 Local Congestion 
A similar situation currently exists for local congestion as existed for zonal 
congestion prior to February 15, 2002. In order to mitigate local market power, the 
ERCOT protocols define a “market solution” for local congestion as when at least three 
unaffiliated resources, with capacity available, submit bids to the ERCOT ISO that can 
solve the local congestion and no one bidder is essential to solving the congestion. If 
there is no market solution, bid prices are mitigated based on verifiable operating costs. 
There has been no “market solution” for local congestion in ERCOT in most 
cases prior to June 2003. That is, local market power is deemed to exist most of the time 
when local transmission constraints are binding. Instead of relying on a market process 
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to determine prices, ERCOT obtains commitments to provide capacity and energy at a 
pre-specified cost level. These are called Out of Merit Order Energy (OOME) and Out 
of Merit Order Capacity (OOMC). OOME services are provided by resources selected 
by ERCOT ISO outside the bidding process in order to resolve l cal congestion when 
no market solution exists. OOMC provides generation capacity needed such that 
balancing energy is available to solve local congestion or other reliability needs when a 
market solution does not exist. OOMC can be provided from any resource or load 
acting as a resource that is listed as available in the resource plan.  
Sometimes a Reliability Must Run (RMR) unit may be needed to provide 
generation capacity or energy resources when there is no market solution. A RMR unit 
is a generation resource unit operated under the terms of an annual agreement with 
ERCOT that would not otherwise be operated usually except that hey are necessary to 
provide voltage support, stability, or management of localized transmission constraints 
under first contingency criteria where Market Solutions do not exist. 
The local congestion cost is uplifted to each QSE based on the load ratio share 
of the QSE. Figure 2.5 shows the local re-dispatch costs in ERCOT from August 2001 
to June 2004. In Docket No. 23220, Petition Of The Electric Reliability Council Of 
Texas (ERCOT) For Approval Of The ERCOT Protocols, the PUCT ordered the 
ERCOT ISO to implement direct assignment of local congestion costs if the re-dispatch 
costs for resolving local congestion rose above $20 million in a rolling twelve-month 
period. The direct assignment of local congestion cost tries o eliminate opportunities 
for market participants to profit from scheduling that result in congestion on local 
transmission lines and to send appropriate signals to locate new generation facilities in 
places that have sufficient transmission capacity to deliver the power to electric 
consumers. The $20 million threshold for local re-dispatch costs was met on March 5, 
2002, after seven months of operation as a single control area. Several proposals have 
been suggested for solving the local congestion problem, includ g implementing nodal 
locational marginal pricing (LMP). ERCOT is currently implementing a Texas Nodal 
Market design process scheduled for full implementation by October 1, 2006. 




























































































Figure 2.5:  Local Congestion Costs 
2.3.6 Day-ahead Ancillary Service Markets 
Ancillary services (AS) are the services necessary to maintain electric system 
reliability and security. In ERCOT, each market participant is assigned an obligation to 
provide ancillary services based on its historical load. Market participants may provide 
the ancillary services themselves or rely on the ERCOT to acquire the ancillary services 
through a centralized auction. From August 2001 to December 2002, market 
participants self-procured between 80% and 90% of their AS obligations. 
ERCOT operates a day-ahead AS market for: Regulation Down Services 
(RgDn), Regulation Up Services (RgUp), Responsive Reserves Services (RRS), Non-
Spinning Reserve Services (NSRS), and Replacement Reserve S ices (RPRS) as 
needed. These ancillary services are procured day-ahead for each hour of the following 
day4. 
We will focus on the ERCOT real-time balancing energy market for the 
applications of models proposed in this dissertation, while other ancillary services 
cleared in the day-ahead ancillary services markets will not be considered. 
                                               
4 Normally the required amount of AS services in ERCOT day-ahead ancillary service markets are: 1200-
1800 MW for RegDn, 1200 MW for RegUp, 2300 MW for RRS, 1250 MW for NSRS if needed, as well 
as some RPRS if such services is needed. 
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CHAPTER 3:  MARKET EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS 
MODELS  
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
In 2001, The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) proposed 
Standard Market Design (SMD) to unify the best practices n market design, and to 
enhance competition in electricity markets under its jurisdiction. Currently every U.S. 
electricity market is seeking ways to improve its market d sign based on its regional 
realities.  
The evaluation of the electricity market efficiency can help to identify necessary 
revisions to current markets. Competitive benchmark analysis is an approach to evaluate 
the performance of electricity markets by estimating how much the actual market prices 
deviate from the perfect competitive benchmark prices based on actual generation costs 
or cost estimates. Although perfect competition is rarely encountered in the real world, 
it provides a benchmark against which to compare various markets having different 
structures. The competitive benchmark approach has been employ d in the studies of 
several electricity markets, including the England and Wales market, the California 
market, the PJM market, and the New England market.  
Although the competitive benchmark approach can evaluate market 
performance, it cannot provide the reasons for the market inefficiency. Many issues can 
contribute to the electricity market inefficiency, such as market design flaws, abuse of 
market power, and inherent engineering features of power system operations. Optimal 
bidding strategies theory has been used to analyze the market pow r issues, which will 
be discussed in Chapter 4. This chapter focuses on the effects of transmission and 
operational constraints on market efficiency. Models are developed to estimate the 
competitive benchmark with transmission and operational constraints and how 
transmission and operational constraints affect market prices based on the submitted 
bids. 
The proposed models in this chapter contribute to the literature in three aspects. 
First, transmission and operational constraints are considered in the competitive 
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benchmark estimation model, which is neglected in most empirical literature. In reality, 
transmission and operational constraints affect the competitive benchmark even if the 
suppliers and buyers truthfully reveal their marginal cost and demand functions. 
Second, the effects of operational and transmission constraints on market prices are 
estimated through two models based on the submitted bids of market participants. 
Third, these models are applied to analyze the efficiency of the ERCOT real-time 
energy market by simulating the market from January 2002 to April 2003, considering 
the characteristics and available information for the ERCOT market. ERCOT is 
undertaking a market redesign rulemaking process. Evaluating the performance of the 
current market is helpful for this policy process.  
Unlike SMD and other electricity markets in the United States that they have 
both a day-ahead pool market and a real-time market, th current ERCOT electricity 
market does not have a bid-based day-ahead energy market. There is only a real-time 
balancing energy market (BEM). ERCOT has a day-ahead portfoli  energy scheduling 
process and a day-ahead ancillary services market. We will only focus on the real-time 
balancing energy market in this dissertation, while other ancillary services will not be 
discussed.  
This chapter is arranged as follows. Section 3.2 describes the proposed models. 
Section 3.3 presents the simulation results of the competitive benchmark model for the 
ERCOT real-time BES market using estimates of actual generation costs. Section 3.4 
provides simulation results of the models for quantifying the effects of transmission and 
operational constraint on the market performance based on the submitted bids in the 
ERCOT market. Section 3.5 concludes this chapter.  
3.2 MODEL FORMULATION  
A perfect competitive benchmark model has the following major ssumptions: 
• All firms are assumed to produce homogeneous, divisible output; 
• No entry or exit barrier; 
• Consumers have full information; 
• Total supply exceeds total demand; 
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• No transaction costs; 
• Each firm is competitive or acts as price-taker. 
Under these assumptions, a firm will produce electricity and sell at its marginal 
cost as long as the marginal cost is less or equal to market price. For the whole market, 
the marginal cost can be defined as the incremental cost to supply the next MW energy 
demand of the system.  
However, transmission constraints and operational constrai ts affect the 
competitive benchmark even if the suppliers and buyers truthfully reveal their marginal 
cost and demand functions. In order to consider these constraints in our market 
efficiency analysis models, we use a DC power flow model to represent the power 
system transmission network.  
3.2.1 Power Flow Model 
Though the electricity industry restructuring is aimed to replace regulation with 
the forces of market competition, the operation of power systems has to obey the 
Kirchhopf’s laws. The balance between supply and demand has to be maintained all the 
time for the requirements of the system reliability and power quality. For the same 
reason, power flows though transmission lines have to be within the transfer capacities 
of the transmission lines.  
Power flow studies are the basis to determine the best operation of electric 
power systems. From the power flow studies, we can obtain the principle information 
for system operation including the magnitude and phase angle of the voltage at each 
bus, and the real and reactive power flowing through eachline.  
In this section, we examine the Newton-Raphson power flow model, the 
decoupled power flow model, and the DC power flow model based on Niu and Guo 
(1998) and Grainger and Stevenson (1994). 
1) The Neton-Raphson power flow model 
It is assumed that there are n  nodes in the system. The bus admittances of the 
electric power system is Y , which is composed of the bus self- and mutual admittances. 
Nodal current, nodal voltage, and nodal complex power are denoted by vectors I , 
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V and S, respectively. The phase expressions for voltage, current and complex power 
can be written as: 
QPS j+= ,     (3.1) 
feV j+= ,     (3.2) 
BGY j+= .     (3.3) 
In power systems, nodal current and nodal voltage satisfy: 
YVI = .     (3.4) 
The complex power can be expressed as: 
IVS ˆˆ = ,     (3.5) 
where Ŝ and V̂ are the conjugate vectors of S and V , respectively. 
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, equation (3.7) becomes: 
( ) VJVDYI ∆=∆+=′∆ .    (3.12) 
where J  is a matrix that is similar to the Jacobian matrix for the load flow problem. 
Equation (3.12) is the correction equation for solving the nonlinear system 






























































































































The above formulation is for the nodes whose nodal real power isP  and reactive 
power isQ are known. For a voltage-controlled bus, its voltage magnitude isV  is kept 
constant and its nodal real power isP  is known. Then the power flow equations for 
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0)( 2222 =+−=∆ iiisi feVV .    (3.15) 
The elements of the matrix J  for the voltage-controlled buses can be obtained 
as we did for equation (3.13). For the off-diagonal elements, where i j≠ : 
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.  (3.17) 
From (3.13), (3.14), (3.16) and (3.17), we update the elements of matrix J  for 
each iteration, and get the corrections for the state variables ie∆ and if∆ . The iterative 














+ )1( .     (3.19) 
The iterations terminate until max{ xiI∆ , yiI∆ , iP∆ , iV∆ } < ε , where ε  is the 
allowable power mismatches and voltage tolerances at the buses. 
 
2) The decoupled power flow model 
In practice, the Jocobian is updated only for every a few it rat ons in order to 
speed up the overall solution process. For large-scale power transmission systems, 
decoupled power-flow method is a way to improving computational efficiency. 
The decoupled power-flow method is an approximate version of the Newton-
Raphson procedure, which simplifies the power-flow model with some characteristics 
of high voltage power system. These characteristics include that real power in the 
transmission lines is affected primarily by the change i the voltage angle, and the flow 
of reactive power in the transmission lines is affected primarily by the change in the 
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voltage magnitude. The physics of transmission-line are also used to simplify the model 
further: 
• Since the angular differences ( ji θθ − ) between typical buses of a well-designed 
and properly operated power transmission system are small, it is assumed that 
1)cos( =− ji θθ  and jiji θθθθ −≈− )sin( . 
• Since line susceptances ijB are much larger than the line conductances ijG , it is 
assumed that )cos()sin( jiijjiij BG θθθθ −<<− . 
• The reactive power injected into any bus of the system during normal operation 
is assumed much less than the reactive power that would fl w if all lines from 
that bus were short-circuited to reference. That is, 
iiii BVQ
2<<  
If we assume the nodal real power and reactive are known f r the first )( mn −  
nodes and other nodes are voltage-control buses, th Newton- Raphson method can be 












































































































































































.   (3.21) 
Through these simplifications, real power and reactive power are decoupled 
separately, and the Jacobian is constant for each iteration. Since the Jocobian is 
generally symmetrical and sparse, once it is computed at the beginning of the solution 
process, it does not need to be recomputed. This reduces the computation load and leads 
to fast iterations. 
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3) DC power flow model 
When approximate power flow solutions are acceptable, the decoupled power 
flow can be simplified further based on the following assumptions: 
• Neglect elements that mainly affect reactive flows: capacitors and reactors; 
• The taps of off-norminal transformers are assumed to be 1; 
• Neglect series resistances in the equivalent-π  circuits of the transmission 
lines; 
• Bus voltage angular differences are small; 
• Bus voltage magnitudes are approximately 1.0pu. 
With the above assumptions, the electric power transmission losses are ignored 
and the power system becomes a lossless network. In addition, (3.21) is not necessary 
because the magnitudes of bus voltage are assumed known. The  (3.20) is called DC 
power flow model.  
Since transmission constraints affect the competitive benchmark even if the 
suppliers and buyers truthfully reveal their marginal cost and demand functions, we 
consider theses constraints in our market efficiency analysis models through the DC 
power flow model to represent the power system transmission ystem. The major 
reasons for our choice of DC power flow model include: currently only real power is 
traded through electricity market; DC power flow model are us d in the market-clearing 
engine for most electricity markets around the world.   
In order to incorporate transmission limits into our competitive benchmark 
model, we adjust the DC power flow model by replacing the nodal real power with the 
net of nodal injection and load. It is assume that there are n  nodes and K  transmission 
lines in the system. The transmission capacity limit vector of the K  transmission lines 
is TkFLFLFL ],[ maxmax2max1max  =FL . The voltage angles for other nodes are 
represented by vector Tn ],[ 21 θθθ =

. The nodal injections, capacity limits, and loads 
are represented by vectors Tnqqq ],[ 21 =q , 
T
nqqq ],[ maxmax2max1max =q , and 
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T
nDDD ],[ 21  =D , where iq  refers to the generation at busi  and iD  refers to the load 
at bus i .  
iiii ptND γ−= )(      (3.22) 
From (3.20), the DC power flow is: 
DqB

−= ,     (3.23) 
where B  is the imaginary part of the system nodal admittance matrix. The real power 
flow on branch between nodei  and node j  is:  
( )jiijij bF θθ −= ,     (3.24) 
where ijb  is absolute value of the branch susceptance between nodes i and j. Therefore, 
transmission capacity constraints are: 
maxFLH  ≤ ,     (3.25) 
where H  is the product of the branch susceptance diagonal matrix and an appropriate 
incidence matrix of branches with nodes. If the k th transmission line connects node i  
and node j , then we have 
jlilnlhbhbh klijkjijki ≠≠∈∀=−== ,,,0,, .    
Substituting (3.23) into (3.25), we have: 
max
1 FLD)(qHB ≤−− .    (3.26) 
Define matrix 1−= HBS , whose elements indicating the sensitivity of branch flows 
to nodal net injections, which are called shift factors. Then the DC power flow and 
transmission capacity constraints are: 
maxFLD)S(q ≤− .                                                   (3.27) 
From (3.27), we observe that the transmission network is indicated in matrix S. 
 
3.2.2 Competitive Benchmark Model with Transmission and Operational 
Constraints 
Using an optimal power flow (OPF) program, the marginal cost for different 
demand levels can be estimated through the following optimization problem 
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considering transmission and operational constraints. The transmission network is 
incorporated into the competitive benchmark model by the DC load fl w model. 


















0)( ,     (3.29) 
maxqq0 ≤≤ ,        (3.30) 
maxFLD)S(q ≤− ,        (3.31) 
max1max2 qqq ∆≤∆≤∆ .    (3.32) 
The objective is to minimize the total system production cost based on the 
production cost of each unit or negative benefits of each consumer. )( ii qC  and )( ii DB  
are the convex production cost and concave consumer benefit function for generator and 
load at node i. Constraint (3.29) represents the system supply and demand balance. 
Constraint (3.30) represents generation capacity limits. The transmission capacity 
constraints are specified by (3.31), where matrix S is the sensitivity of branch flows to 
nodal net injections, or shift factors. The operational constraints (ramp rate constraints) 
are represented by (3.32). Vectors max1q∆  and max2q∆ represent the adjustable up and 
down range of generator output, which depends on its up and down ramp rates, where 
1−−=∆ ttt qqq  is the change in generation from time t-1 to time t. Ramp rates are the 
principal operational constraints considered in this dissertation. 
The Lagrangian for the optimal problem is: 





















,  (3.33) 
where λ ,  , 1 , 2 , and 3  are multiplier vectors for the constraints of system 
balance, transmission, generator capacity, and ramp rate constraints.  
Since the problem is convex, we can find the optimal solution, denoted as 
TTqz ],,,[ ***** ωµλ= , by solving the first order necessary conditions. Because the 
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nodal marginal cost is defined as the incremental cost for providing next unit of nodal 













µλθ ,    (3.34)  
where kis  is the element (k , i) of matrix S. The difference between the actual market 
prices and the marginal costs indicates the price mark-up. 
3.2.3 Market Clearing Mechanism 
The Independent System Operator (ISO) clears the electricity market based on 
bids submitted from market participants, instead of their costs. The objective of market 
clearing is to minimize the total system cost based on the bid prices. Therefore, the 
market clearing mechanism can be described as the above competitive benchmark 
model, except that we replace cost and benefit functions with supply and demand bids: 

























0)( ,     (3.36) 
maxqq0 ≤≤ ,        (3.37) 
maxFLD)S(q ≤− ,        (3.38) 
max1max2 qqq ∆≤∆≤∆ ,    (3.39) 
where ( )isi qf  and ( )idi qf  represents supply and demand bids submitted to the system 
operator. Along with the constraints from (3.29)-(3.33), this model gives the market 
clearing model. In order to refer to the market clearing model in a later section, we 
number the constraints in market clearing model separately from the competitive 
benchmark model. System balance constraint is (3.36). Equation (3.37) represents the 
generation capacity limits. Equation (3.38) represents the transmission constraints, and 
(3.39) represents operational constraints. Similar to (3.34), based on the optimal 
solution, the nodal market clearing price is: 








** µλ .     (3.40) 
Binding operational and transmission constraints affect market price through 
changes in the optimal value of λ and  . Constraints may force the ISO to skip some 
cheaper bids and deploy some more expensive bids. For exampl , even though cheap 
units are on line, they may not be dispatchable because ramp rate constraints limit their 
ability to deviate from their previous generation levels.  
In order to analyze the effects of transmission and operational constraints on 
market prices, we form a Non-Constrained Model (NCM) and a Transmission-
Constrained Model (TCM) based on actual market bids. NCM estimates the market 
price without considering either transmission or operational constraints by relaxing 
(3.38) and (3.39) in the market clearing model based on the submitted bids. TCM 
estimates the market price considering transmission constrai t , but the operational 
constraint (3.39) is still ignored.  
For the transmission un-congested case, the differenc between NCM prices and 
actual market prices indicates the effects of operational constraints on market results 
based on the submitted bids. For the transmission-congested case, this difference 
reflects the effects of both transmission and operation l constraints. The price difference 
between the NCM and the TCM reflects how transmission congestion affects the market 
result based on the submitted bids. The difference between the TCM prices and actual 
market prices indicates the effect of operational constraints on market prices based on 
the submitted bids. The correlation between transmission and operational constraints is 
not considered here because the operational constraint information is not publicly 
available. 
3.3  APPLICATION OF COMPETITIVE BENCHMARK MODEL  
A competitive benchmark model with CSC transmission constraints is 
developed for the ERCOT market from January 2002 to April 2003 in this section. 
Since there is no public information about operational constraints, we only consider 
CSC transmission constraints in the ERCOT competitive benchmark model, which 
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could result in underestimated marginal cost. Actual prices for the ERCOT BEM are 
compared with the simulated competitive benchmark prices to es imate the market 
performance. The information related to the software for the applications of these 
models is provided in the appendix. 
3.3.1 ERCOT Model Formulation 
There were four congestion zones for both 2002 and 2003 in ERCOT: North 
Zone, South Zone, West Zone and Houston Zone. Figure 3.1 shows the four congestion 
zones in ERCOT.  
Figure 3.1:  ERCOT Congestion Zones 2002 & 2003 
The transmission from Sandow to Temple (South to North), Graham to Parker 
(West to North), STP to DOW (South to Houston), and Parker to Graham (North to 
West) were the four CSCs for 2002. There are only three CSCs in 2003, involving 
transmission from STP to Dow (South to Houston), from Graham to Parker (West to 
North) and from Sandow to Temple (South to North). There was CSC congestion for 
about 16.7% of the intervals during our test time period. Table 3.1 lists the monthly 
summary of the congested intervals for South to Houston CSC (S-H), South to North 
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Table 3.1:  CSC Congestion Frequency  









Jan-02 661 1030 0 0 1520 51.1% 
Feb-02 356 501 57 0 834 31.0% 
Mar-02 29 243 79 90 432 14.5% 
Apr-02 122 99 329 212 741 25.7% 
May-02 267 10 27 38 334 11.2% 
Jun-02 677 335 24 115 1067 37.1% 
Jul-02 505 477 0 221 997 33.5% 
Aug-02 380 172 0 140 649 21.8% 
Sep-02 565 18 0 70 649 22.5% 
Oct-02 54 4 49 88 189 6.3% 
Nov-02 0 2 0 29 31 1.1% 
Dec-02 0 41 2 18 61 2.1% 
Jan-03 59 25 0 0 84 2.8% 
Feb-03 9 56 0 0 65 2.4% 
Mar-03 259 163 5 0 412 13.8% 
Apr-03 270 103 0 0 373 13.0% 
Total 4069 3160 365 838 7789 16.7% 
 
Normally, transmission congestion should be less serious during the low 
demand period of winter. The reason for the high congestion frequency in January 2002 
and February 2002 was that the CSC congestion “re-dispatch cost” was uplifted among 
market participants on a “load ratio share” since the ERCOT ISO began operation as a 
single “control area” on July 31, 2001. This presented an opportunity for profiting by 
over-scheduling load and then being paid to relieve congestion. After February 15, 
2002, the charge or payment related to CSC congestion to a QSE is based on its 
scheduled flow and their TCR ownership on the congested CSCs. Therefore the CSC 
congestion frequency decreased and the over-scheduling problem was not found during 
the other months of our analysis period. 
By neglecting “intrazonal” constraints within the four congestion zones, the 
ERCOT market can be simplified to a four-node system. Based on the competitive 
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benchmark model in Section 3.2, separate cost curves for each zone should be 
developed to estimate marginal costs. Marginal costs will be the same for all zones if no 
constraint on CSCs is binding. In case of CSC congestion, marginal cost will be 
different in each zone. Because of the CSCs’ congestion, some expensive resources 
have to be deployed to meet the system demand even though cheaper sources may be 
available in other zones. 
The zonal cost curve depends on the availability, cost structures of generation 
resources in each zone, and fuel prices in ERCOT. The installed generation capacities 
of ERCOT were about 77,000 MW in 2002, and 79,000 MW in 2003, respectively (EIA 
(2002a), PUCT (2003a)). Table 3.2 shows the generation mix of ERCOT by capacity 
during 2002 and 2003. 
Table 3.2:  Generation Capacity Mix in ERCOT 
Resource 2002 2003 
Natural Gas 68.9% 72.6% 
Coal & Lignite 23.3% 21.2% 
Nuclear 5.6% 5.9% 
Wind 1.1% 1.2% 
Hydro 0.7% 0.7% 
Others 0.4% 0.4% 
 
From Table 3.2 we can see that more than 90% of the installed capacities in 
ERCOT are fossil fuel units. In developing the zonal cost curve, we assume that all 
capacities of nuclear units are available because nuclear generators always supply the 
base load and their forced outage rate is very low. Due to the dependence on weather 
conditions, it is impractical to model the production cost f r hydro and wind generation 
units explicitly. We assume 50% of hydro and wind capacities ar  available. Since the 
hydro and wind generation together account for only about 1.9% of the installed 
capacity in ERCOT, and their generation cost is very low, this assumption will have 
little effect on our analysis about the balancing energy market. In addition, the system 
demand is always much larger than the total capacity of nuclear, wind, and hydro units. 
Therefore we formulate the zonal cost curve only considering coal units and natural gas 
units. The capacity of the other resources in each zone will be deducted from the zonal 
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demand, and their effects on CSC are considered. If those units ever become the 
marginal unit in the balancing market, our results could overestimate the marginal cost. 
For fossil fuel generation units, the production cost for each unit is based on the 
fuel price and its average heat rate, which is a common assumption in the literature. The 
average heat rate for each unit is obtained from (Henwood (2002), EPA (2002), PUCT 
(2002)). Although incremental unit heat rate curve would be more appropriate, this 
information is not available to us. The gas prices are obtained from the Market 
Oversight Division (MOD) at the Public Utility Commisson of Texas (PUCT). Coal 
prices are from (EIA (2002b)). No attempt is made to capture he operating, planned 
maintenance, environmental cost, and ancillary services purchased in the ERCOT day-
ahead market. Ignoring those factors could lead us to underestimate the marginal cost. 
However, forced outage has been considered through derating un t capacity by its 
forced outage rate. 
For each zone, a heat rate curve was developed for the units within the zone. 
Assume there are m  generation units in ERCOT, indexed by mj ,,2,1  = . The average 
cost jic  for each MW of electricity generated by unit j  in zone ni ,,2,1 = , is: 
jjgjcji hppc ))1(( ϕϕ +−= ,    (3.41) 
where 
cp  Price for coal, $/MMBtu; 
gp  Price for natural gas, $/MMBtu; 
jϕ  Fuel type of generation unit j ; 0 if coal, 1 if gas; 
jh  Heat rate for generation unit j , MMBtu/MWh. 
All im  units in a zone are sorted by increasing average cost of each MW of 
electricity production, so that imii iccc ≤≤≤

21  in zone i . Then the approximate 






















     (3.42) 
where 
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)( ii qg   The marginal cost for iq MW supply in zone i ;  
jib  The the average capacity for unit j  in zone i , which equals to its 
installed capacity times (1-jr );  
jr   The forced outage rate of generation unitj based on the NERC 
outage probability statistics (NERC (2002)).  
The zonal cost curve is:   
= i
q
iii dqqgqC 0 )()(
     (3.43) 
By the nodal cost function (3.43), the actual zonal load, an  CSC transmission 
capacities published by the ERCOT ISO every 15 minutes during January 2002 and 
April 2003, the ERCOT competitive benchmark model is constructed as (3.7)-(3.10) for 
each interval during the test time period. The object is to minimize the total production 
cost of the whole market subject to the supply demand balance constraint, the CSC 
























)( ,                       
niqq ii ∈∀≤ max ,       
where 
  i   Index of zone, 4,,2,1 =i ; 
kis   Shift factor of zone i  on CSC k ; 
kFL   Capacity limit of CSC k ; 
iq   Generation output at zone i ; 
maxiq   Generation capacity limit at zone i ; 
id   Demand of zone i . 
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Although the competitive benchmark will be applied to the ERCOT balancing 
energy market, which accounts for only 3%-5% of the en rgy consumption in ERCOT, 
the actual system load for every 15 minutes interval of the ERCOT market is used to 
clear the competitive benchmark model. Market participants reflect their bilateral 
contracts in their portfolio schedules. We assume market participants use the cheapest 
or most efficient units to supply their native load to meet their bilateral contract 
obligations, and bid the extra available capacity to the balancing energy market. In other 
words, we assume that the pattern of dispatch is equivalent to that of a centralized 
energy pool market and that the balancing energy is the marginal part for the clearing of 
system load.  
The impact of resources and load within a commercial congestion zone on the 
CSCs transmission constraints is reflected by the zonal generation weighted average 
shift factors, which are determined by the ERCOT ISO monthly based on known 
topology of the ERCOT system. Any imbalance between loads and generation resources 
in a congestion zone is assumed to have the same impact on a given CSC. The resulting 
flows of all dispatched generations on the CSCs have to be within their transmission 
capacity. 
By (3.34), the zonal marginal competitive price iθ  can be obtained. When there 
is CSC congestion, the zonal competitive prices will differ from zone to zone. The 
generation weighted average competitive price for the system demand 

















θ .  (3.44) 
3.3.2 Application Result 
The estimated competitive benchmark prices were compared to the actual BEM 
prices to estimate an efficiency index called the Lerner Index (LI) for the ERCOT 
BEM. The ERCOT ISO determines and posts the Zonal Mrket Clearing Prices 
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(MCPE) of balancing energy services (BES) for every 15 minutes interval, which we 
refer to as the actual market price.  
BES includes Balancing Energy Up (BEU) and Balancing E ergy Down (BED). 
Since BEU and BED are settled differently, we estima e their indices separately. For 
BEU, the LI is defined as the percentage of the difference between the actual market 
price and marginal cost (actual market price – margin l cost) divided by the actual 
market price. The LI for the BED is defined as the difference between marginal cost and 
the actual market price divided by the actual market price. We adopted a quantity 
weighted LI to estimate the competitiveness of BES.  
The weighted average BES price (we refer to weighted average as simply the 
average in this chapter), tp



















π ,    (3.45) 
where  
π  The index of BES: u  is for BEU and d  is for BED; 
π
itp   The actual zonal market price for BES π  at interval t ; 
π
itq  The zonal deployed MW for BES π at interval t . 
























π ,    (3.25) 
where 
π  The index of BES: u  is for BEU and d  is for BED; 1uδ =  and 1dδ = − ; 
t
πθ  The competitive benchmark price at interval t  developed from the above 
competitive benchmark model;  
tq
π  The net balancing energy deployment for interval t .   
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Because the BEU price represents the price paid by the ERCOT ISO to QSEs, a 
higher BEU index means a larger market price deviation fromthe competitive price. In 
contrast, the BED price is paid by QSEs to the ISO. Therefore, a lower BED price 
means more deviation from the competitive price. The factor 1dδ = −  in the BED index 
definition means that a higher BED LI corresponds to a larger negative deviation of 
BED price from the competitive price. 




















Jan-02 2.25 20.86 22.03 22.66 6.59 8.0% 234.4% 
Feb-02 2.30 21.51 21.78 27.16 9.67 20.8% 125.3% 
Mar-02 3.07 28.05 27.46 32.34 13.11 13.3% 109.4% 
Apr-02 3.44 34.20 31.38 47.70 17.44 28.3% 79.9% 
May-02 3.50 32.71 33.03 34.47 15.38 5.1% 114.8% 
Jun-02 3.24 33.27 31.86 35.07 17.74 5.1% 79.6% 
Jul-02 3.02 30.83 29.29 33.07 16.55 6.8% 77.0% 
Aug-02 3.09 31.34 31.24 31.20 17.85 -0.5% 75.1% 
Sep-02 3.53 35.09 34.03 33.46 15.56 -4.9% 118.6% 
Oct-02 4.03 38.05 34.43 42.54 17.34 10.6% 98.5% 
Nov-02 3.93 36.53 34.05 35.38 14.01 -3.3% 143.0% 
Dec-02 4.55 43.57 39.97 40.28 11.74 -8.2% 240.4% 
Jan-03 5.21 51.86 48.46 52.49 17.78 1.2% 172.6% 
Feb-03 7.59 86.39 46.47 102.43 19.31 15.7% 140.6% 
Mar-03 6.00 66.47 42.68 74.70 31.04 11.0% 37.5% 
Apr-03 5.21 50.53 42.04 59.83 16.57 15.6% 153.8% 
Average 4.00 46.97 32.82 51.56 16.15 8.9% 103.3% 
 
The monthly average of gas price, marginal cost (MC), BES price, and LI of the 
ERCOT BES market form January 2002 to April 2003 are summarized in Table 3.3. 
Some intervals were excluded from the index calculation in order to avoid the influence 
of abnormal events, such as forced outages, software failures, and operation errors 
(ERCOT (2003a)). There are a total of 464 intervals excluded for the testing time 
period, which account for only about 0.9% of the total testintervals. For the abnormal 
intervals, the average LI of BEU was 79.8%, and the average LI of BED was 137.7%. 
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The reason for the high indices of the abnormal intervals is that MCPEs of some 
abnormal intervals were higher than $900/MWh or lower than–$100/MWh. 
3.3.3 Result Analysis 
In order to benchmark the performance of the ERCOT BES market, we need to 
compare it with other restructured electricity markets. Bushnell and Saravia (2002) 
found the average LI of the New England electricity day-ahead market from May 1999 
to September 2001 to be 12%. The average LI of the PJM, California, and New England 
day-ahead market from May 1999 to December 1999 were estimated to be 25%, 17%, 
and 10%, respectively. 
Because the ERCOT market opened later than the PJM, the California, and the 
New England markets, there is no overlap of the time period between our analysis and 
Bushnell and Saravia’s study. However, we can still usefully compare the ERCOT 
market index with their results, because they all concern the early stages of market 
operations. 
However, we should note that all the analysis of the other restructured markets 
besides ERCOT is for day-ahead markets and not of a real-time balancing market. We 
will only compare the BEU indices of ERCOT to the indices in the literature for day-
ahead market. Since day-ahead markets have a different rol  from that of real-time 
balancing markets, results for day-ahead and balancing markets should be compared 
with caution.  
As seen from Table 3.3, the LI of BEU in the ERCOT BES market ranges from 
–8.2% to 28.3% and the average is about 8.9% during the 16 sample months. The 
average BEU LI is only 2% from May to December 2002, including the abnormal 
intervals. Compared with the index of other markets for the similar months, from May 
to December 1999, the performance of BEU in ERCOT is favorable during the period.  
On the other hand, the BED market in ERCOT is relatively inefficient compared 
with its BEU market. The LI of BED ranges from 37.5% to 234.4%, and averages about 
103.3% for the whole period. It is much higher than the average index for the BEU.  
The high capacity reserve margins in ERCOT presumably contributed to the 
competitive performance of the BEU market. Several circumstances, including the 
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transmission interconnection rules and renewable energy credit-trading program, have 
encouraged significant new generation investments in ERCOT since 1995. The reserve 
margins were 34% and 21% for 2002 and 2003, respectively. The high volume of 
bilateral contracts provides mitigation against the effects of the market power, which 
presumably also contributed to the competitive BEU market. The analysis in Chapter 4 
will show the effects of forward contracts on the ERCOT market results. 
However, attention should be paid to the high index of the BED market, which 
indicates that the QSEs bid prices that were lower than m rginal cost, and were 
reluctant to decrease their output or take part in the BEDmarket. In ERCOT, BEU and 
BED bid curves consist of monotonically increasing ordered pairs of dollars per 
megawatt-hour and cumulative megawatts ($/MWh, MW). The ERCOT ISO orders all 
bids received for BEU hourly from the lowest bid price to the highest bid price, and 
BED hourly bids from the highest bid price to the lowest bid price. These combined bid 
curves are called the BEU and BED bid stack respectively. The hourly weighted 
average bid price (WABP), hp






















π ,    (3.47) 
where 
h  The index of hour, 1,2, ,24h =  ;  
hjp
π  The bid price of BESπ at blockj ; 
π
hjb  The bid quantity of BESπ at blockj ; 
hN
π  The number of blocks for BES π at hourh . 
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Figure 3.2:  The Weighted Average Bid Price of BED and BEU 
Figure 3.2 shows that the monthly average bid price of BEU and BED. The 
WABP of BED is much lower than that of BEU. This means that QSEs submit very low 
or negative BED bid prices in order to avoid being “balanced down.” Avoiding BED 
deployment could limit the mechanical damage of frequent up and down movements. 
Because market participants self commit their units and only one-part bidding (energy 
bid) is permitted in the ERCOT BES market, the balancing down bids must recover any 
subsequent start-up cost if balancing down necessitated a shut-down. Participants 
usually arrange the unit commitment one day ahead to decide the sequence of their on-
line units. Units may be constrained by their minimum generation limits during off-peak 
hours, and QSEs may be reluctant to deploy their units for BED to avoid possible shut 
down of units. During on-peak hours, these limits are relatively relaxed. Therefore 
QSEs would presumably prefer to decrease their generation during on-peak hours if 
they can find cheaper suppliers to meet their demand. Figure 3.3 compares the LI of 
BES during on-peak and off-peak hours for each month from January 2002 to April 
2003. Off-peak hours refer to the hours ending 23:00 to 6:00, while on-peak hours refer 
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Figure 3.3:  Lerner Index of Peak and Off-Peak Hours 
As shown in Figure 3.3, the LI of BED during off-peak hours was higher than 
those of on-peak hours, except for March 2003, when t  indices were very close. This 
suggests that the unit commitment and lower generation limits affected the BED index, 
and could contribute to the high BED index. Even though the BED indices were 
relatively lower during on-peak hours, they were still much higher than the BEU 
indices. This could result in inefficient dispatch. Similarly, we can find that the unit 
commitment and generation limits also affect the BEU index, because LI of BEU during 
off-peak hours was lower than those of on-peak hours for most of the months. During 
off-peak hours, QSEs would presumably consider increasing generation from on-line 
generators, since the output is well under their upper limits during that time. On the 
other hand, the upper operation limits are relatively tight during on-peak hours. 
In addition to the unit commitment and operational limits, other factors such as 
the gas pipeline transportation and inventory limits can also be the reasons for the high 
BED index. In addition, frequent increasing and decreasing generation output is harmful 
to the turbines of generation units. QSEs could avoid this machine damage by bidding 
low or negative BED price to prevent them from being dispatch BED. So lower or 
negative BED bid price may reflect the costs of damage or adjustment cost.  
Furthermore, during the period we study, the ERCOT market still had design 
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the flaw would be benign if firms acted as pure price takers, rather than exploiting these 
design flaws to affect the market price. Bad judgment and confusion on the new market 
of some generators may also contribute the inefficincies of balancing down energy 
market of ERCOT. Some participants may not like to take part in the ERCOT BED 
market even though there may be cheaper suppliers available. 
3.4  APPLICATION OF TRANSMISSION AND OPERATION 
CONSTRAINTS ANALYSIS MODELS  
Even though the competitive benchmark approach identified that the ERCOT 
market deviates from the competitive outcomes (relativ ly small deviation for BEU, but 
considerable deviation for BED), it is not informative about the specific reasons for the 
deviations. Market power and technical constraints such as unit commitment, 
operational constraints, and transmission limits could be some other possible reasons.   
It is impossible to find all the reasons for the departure from the competitive 
pricing and quantify their effects. Considerable work (Hogan (1992, 1997), Oren 
(1997), Joskow, and Tirole (2000)) focuses on how transmission congestion can 
increase market power. Operational constraints could potentially also be manipulated by 
participants to force the ISO to dispatch their units profitably. Since CSC transmission 
constraints and operational constraints (portfolio BEU and BED ramp rate) are the two 
major constraints in the ERCOT BEM clearing process (ERCOT (2002b)) during our 
test time period, we will focus only on these two factors and develop models to quantify 
their effects on market performance. By effects of CSC or operational constraints, we 
mean how much these constraints influence MCPE, given the participant’s actual BEM 
bids and schedules. Market power could be reflected in the result, but we do not intend 
to separate the impacts of market power from other issues. 
3.4.1 ERCOT Model Formulation 
Actual market prices reflect the effects of both operational and CSC constraints 
as the market clearing mechanism discussed in Section 3.2. In order to analyze the 
effects of CSC and operational constraints, we developed Non-Constrained Model 
(NCM) and Transmission Constrained Model (TCM) for the ERCOT market based on 
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the actual BES bids as discussed in Section 3.2. But we have to consider schedules 
submitted by QSEs for the ERCOT models. The clearing quantities are set to be the 
actual system BES demands. The objective of NCM is to minimize the total system cost 
based on the BES bid stack and schedules submitted by QSEs. The NCM is shown as 
follows. 
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Qji
d
ji IjRq ∈∀≤ , ,     (3.51) 
where 
QI   The set of QSEs; 
QN   Number of QSEs;  
)( uji
u
ji qf  BEU bid curve for QSE j in zonei ;  
)( dji
d
ji qf  BED bid curve for QSE j in zonei ; 
u
jiq   Deployed MW of BEU for QSE j in zonei ; 
d
jiq   Deployed MW of BED for QSE j in zonei ; 
jiS   Total generation schedule for QSE j in zonei ; 
jiU   BEU bid quantity for QSE j in zonei ; 
jiR    BED bid quantity for QSE j in zonei . 
 
Since there is no CSC constraint in NCM, the MCPE will be the same for all 
zone: µ=ip , where µ  is the shadow price for the power balance constraint (3.49). 
The TCM is formulated as an optimization problem by adding the following 
















    (3.52) 
The zonal MCPE of TCM can be calculated as in (3.40). The objectives for 
those models are to minimize system cost. If the BEU and BED bid stack are considered 
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separately, lower system cost always means lower MCPE. However, if some BEU bid 
prices are lower than some BED bid prices, known as overlap, lower system cost does 
not always indicate lower MCPE. Figure 3.4 shows an example of this situation. There 
was overlap for about 43.2% of intervals during the test period. 
Figure 3.4:  Overlap in the BES Market Clearing Mechanism 
In Figure 3.4, we assume BEU demand is B MW. If we only consider BEU bid 
curve, the MCPE should be P1, and the system cost is area OBEG. However, there is 
overlap between BEU and BED bid curve. If C MW BEU and A MW BED (C - A = B) 
are deployed, the BEU demand is still satisfied and the system cost changes by area 
(BCDE – GFH). If area BCDE is less than area GFH, the system cost will decrease. 
Therefore MCPE will be P2, even though it is higher than P1. The reason is that the 
ISO’s objective is to minimize system cost, not to miniize the expected MCPE. 
Similarly, higher system cost does not always mean higher MCPE. The operational and 
CSC constraints always increase system cost, but they may not have the same effect on 











BED Bid Curve 
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Bid MW/Bid Price 
BED 
Bid MW/Bid Price 
BES  
Deployment 
Unit 1 5 60 50 10MW @ $5/MWh 50MW @ $5/MWh 10 
Unit 2 10 60 40 20MW @ $10/MWh 40MW @ $10/MWh 5 
Unit 3 15 50 10 40MW @ $15/MWh 10MW @ $15/MWh -10 
 
In the above example, we assume all units bid their magin l cost. The 
scheduled total generation is 100 MW. Therefore, the ISO needs 5 MW BEU to meet 
the system demand. To minimize the cost to supply the 5 MW balancing energy, the 
ERCOT ISO will dispatch 10 MW BEU to unit 1 and 5 MW BEU to unit2, and 10 MW 
BED to unit 3. The MCPE will be $10/MWh. In this case, there is overlap between 
BEU and BED bid. Unit 3 would like to pay $15/MW to other cheap r generator to 
cover its own load. If the unit 3 bid 10 MW BED at $3/MW, theERCOT ISO will only 
dispatch 10 MW to unit 1. No balancing energy will be dispatched to unit 2, and unit 3. 
Since the BED bid of unit 3 is lower than the marginal cost of unit 1 and unit 2, no BEU 
is deployed to cover the load of unit 3. The MCPE for this ca e will be $5/MWh.  
3.4.2 Application Results 
Based on the submitted BES bid stacks, actual zonal load, BES demand, zonal 
generation schedule, and CSCs transmission capacities, market prices of the NCM and 
the TCM were calculated for all the intervals by simulating the market during January 
2002 and April 2003, excluding the abnormal intervals mentioned in section 3.3. 
Excluding these intervals avoids the bias from the abnormal conditions. Tables 3.5 and 
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Table 3.5:  BEU Prices ($/MWh) 
Un-congested Congested Intervals Total Intervals BEU 
Price NCM Actual NCM TCM Actual NCM TCM Actual 
Jan-02 20.78 21.11 20.41 23.45 24.23 20.60 22.11 22.66 
Feb-02 20.51 21.10 21.73 25.27 35.78 21.01 22.47 27.16 
Mar-02 31.62 32.77 27.90 29.55 30.45 30.94 31.25 32.34 
Apr-02 36.03 35.94 37.66 42.45 79.77 36.47 37.75 47.70 
May-02 34.05 34.52 31.30 32.98 33.32 33.94 34.01 34.47 
Jun-02 33.27 33.67 33.63 36.72 36.82 33.43 34.81 35.07 
Jul-02 32.57 32.86 30.55 38.42 33.58 31.98 34.27 33.07 
Aug-02 29.98 30.46 31.67 34.02 34.28 30.31 30.76 31.20 
Sep-02 31.57 31.82 33.54 38.42 38.53 32.05 33.24 33.46 
Oct-02 38.89 41.71 40.43 45.88 52.57 39.01 39.43 42.54 
Nov-02 34.66 35.35 32.67 40.49 40.10 34.65 34.69 35.38 
Dec-02 39.24 40.23 39.54 40.76 41.44 39.26 39.31 40.28 
Jan-03 51.00 52.50 47.69 47.60 52.23 50.94 50.94 52.49 
Feb-03 98.92 103.54 55.47 61.78 63.93 97.70 97.88 102.43 
Mar-03 67.76 71.81 70.85 84.31 86.19 68.38 71.09 74.70 
Apr-03 55.41 57.85 47.74 67.86 74.77 54.51 56.87 59.83 
Average 51.21 53.17 35.15 41.03 43.05 48.66 49.59 51.56 
 
Table 3.6:  BED Prices ($/MWh) 
Un-congested Congested Intervals Total Intervals BED 
Price NCM Actual NCM TCM Actual NCM TCM Actual 
Jan-02 7.91 7.71 11.29 5.82 4.97 9.30 7.06 6.59 
Feb-02 9.95 9.89 10.75 8.89 9.11 10.18 9.65 9.67 
Mar-02 12.71 13.22 13.87 12.15 12.28 12.84 12.65 13.11 
Apr-02 16.91 17.48 18.87 16.90 17.33 17.42 16.91 17.44 
May-02 15.92 15.17 19.21 16.95 16.73 16.36 16.06 15.38 
Jun-02 16.93 16.75 23.46 19.29 19.48 19.30 17.79 17.74 
Jul-02 17.51 16.64 19.09 17.18 16.41 18.12 17.39 16.55 
Aug-02 17.39 17.22 21.36 19.43 19.56 18.45 17.93 17.85 
Sep-02 15.50 14.95 21.43 18.07 18.47 16.53 15.95 15.56 
Oct-02 17.38 17.16 24.66 23.40 23.22 17.60 17.56 17.34 
Nov-02 14.39 14.00 17.31 15.60 15.84 14.41 14.40 14.01 
Dec-02 11.34 11.73 27.76 28.00 29.54 11.35 11.35 11.74 
Jan-03 17.47 17.74 28.25 27.40 20.51 17.61 17.60 17.78 
Feb-03 18.84 19.26 41.31 38.02 26.97 19.00 18.98 19.31 
Mar-03 29.53 30.73 39.84 40.21 36.72 30.08 30.10 31.04 
Apr-03 14.95 15.16 27.38 27.42 22.90 17.21 17.22 16.57 
Average 16.15 16.16 19.09 16.42 16.09 16.73 16.20 16.15 
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Tables 3.7 and 3.8 compare the LI index based on the estimated prices of the 
NCM, TCM, and the actual market price for the un-congested intervals and congested 
intervals respectively. 
Table 3.7:  LI for Un-congested Intervals 
BEU BED Month 
NCM Actual NCM Actual 
Jan-02 -2.1% -0.5% 178.5% 185.9% 
Feb-02 -5.9% -3.0% 121.9% 123.3% 
Mar-02 10.9% 14.0% 116.5% 108.2% 
Apr-02 6.4% 6.1% 86.4% 80.2% 
May-02 4.0% 5.3% 107.0% 117.3% 
Jun-02 0.2% 1.4% 87.4% 89.4% 
Jul-02 5.4% 6.2% 67.4% 76.1% 
Aug-02 -3.3% -1.7% 79.6% 81.4% 
Sep-02 -10.6% -9.8% 117.9% 125.9% 
Oct-02 2.8% 9.3% 97.8% 100.3% 
Nov-02 -5.4% -3.4% 137.0% 143.6% 
Dec-02 -11.0% -8.3% 252.6% 240.8% 
Jan-03 -1.6% 1.3% 177.3% 173.1% 
Feb-03 12.3% 16.2% 146.2% 140.9% 
Mar-03 1.0% 6.6% 43.5% 38.0% 
Apr-03 8.7% 12.6% 172.4% 168.7% 
Average 4.0% 7.6% 106.7% 106.5% 
 
As shown in Table 3.7, for the un-congested intervals of the test period, the 
average LI indices for the NCM and the actual market price are 4.0% and 7.6%, 
respectively. As we discussed in Section 3.2.3, by comparing the results of NCM and 
the actual market clearing mechanism, we observe that operational constraints increase 
the average BEU index by 3.6% from 4.0% to 7.6%. But the average BED index 
changed only 0.2%, which means that the operational constraint  did not affect the BED 
performance much for the un-congested intervals. 
For the congested intervals of the test period in Table 3.8, the operational and 
CSC constraints increased the average BEU index by an average of 18.9%, from –1.3% 
to 17.6%, with a 14.9% (from –1.3% to 13.6%) increment due to CSC congestion and a 
4% (from 13.6% to 17.6%) increment due to the operational constraints. At the same 
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time, the CSC congestion and operational constraints contributed an average of 26.4% 
increment to the BED index (from 63.9% to 90.3%), with a 22.5% (from 63.9% to 
86.4%) increment due to CSC congestion and a 3.9% (from 86.4% to 90.3%) increment 
due to operational constraints. Independence between the CSC and operational 
constraints is assumed in the above discussion because the operational constraint 
information is not available in public. In summary, both of the CSC congestion and 
operational constraints contribute to the BES market results, with the CSC congestion 
having more effect than the operational constraints during our test period. 
Table 3.8:  LI for Intervals with Congestion 
BEU BED 
Month 
NCM TCM Actual NCM TCM Actual 
Jan-02 -3.2% 12.6% 15.4% 97.5% 278.5% 342.9% 
Feb-02 0.8% 16.1% 40.7% 102.4% 136.5% 130.8% 
Mar-02 -1.5% 7.0% 9.7% 101.1% 122.3% 120.0% 
Apr-02 5.7% 16.5% 55.5% 72.7% 83.4% 78.9% 
May-02 -7.3% -0.5% 0.5% 83.4% 97.8% 100.5% 
Jun-02 1.0% 9.2% 9.4% 38.0% 66.5% 64.9% 
Jul-02 -0.6% 19.7% 8.1% 54.9% 70.3% 78.4% 
Aug-02 -2.8% 3.5% 4.2% 46.9% 60.9% 59.8% 
Sep-02 -5.8% 7.4% 7.6% 66.7% 95.0% 90.8% 
Oct-02 0.9% 11.1% 22.4% 47.3% 53.0% 54.2% 
Nov-02 -1.1% 16.9% 16.1% 75.7% 66.5% 64.0% 
Dec-02 -11.0% -7.1% -5.4% 50.2% 50.7% 42.8% 
Jan-03 -14.5% -14.8% -4.6% 75.9% 81.3% 142.2% 
Feb-03 -35.4% -20.2% -16.1% 39.7% 51.4% 113.5% 
Mar-03 8.8% 24.0% 25.7% 18.7% 19.3% 30.7% 
Apr-03 -4.9% 26.0% 32.8% 73.8% 74.9% 109.4% 
Average -1.3% 13.6% 17.6% 63.9% 86.4% 90.3% 
 
Since the NCM does not consider operational and CSC constraint , the result 
only indicates the effect of the participants’ bids. For all the congested and un-
congested normal intervals during the test 16 months, the average index of NCM was 
3.4% for BEU and 97.0% for BED as shown in Table 3.9. Compared with the actual 
BEU index of 8.9% and BED index of 103.3%, CSC congestion and operational 
constraints increased the average BEU index by 5.5%, and the average BED index by 
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3.3%. That is, the CSC and operational constraints did not contribute very much to the 
high BED market index. Therefore the high BED index indicates inefficient BED bid 
behaviors or other un-modeled operational constraints, and the low BEU index indicates 
relatively efficient BEU bid behaviors in the ERCOT BES market from January 2002 to 
April 2003.  
Table 3.9:  LI for All Intervals of Test Months  
BEU BED 
Month 
NCM TCM Actual NCM TCM Actual 
Jan-02 -2.6% 5.7% 8.0% 138.2% 212.3% 234.4% 
Feb-02 -3.1% 4.3% 20.8% 116.1% 125.8% 125.3% 
Mar-02 8.9% 10.2% 13.3% 114.6% 117.1% 109.4% 
Apr-02 6.2% 9.4% 28.3% 82.5% 85.6% 79.9% 
May-02 3.6% 3.8% 5.1% 103.3% 105.7% 114.8% 
Jun-02 0.5% 4.4% 5.1% 65.6% 79.1% 79.6% 
Jul-02 3.7% 10.0% 6.8% 62.3% 68.5% 77.0% 
Aug-02 -3.2% -1.9% -0.5% 69.5% 74.2% 75.1% 
Sep-02 -9.4% -5.6% -4.9% 106.3% 113.4% 118.6% 
Oct-02 2.6% 3.5% 10.6% 95.7% 96.1% 98.5% 
Nov-02 -5.4% -5.3% -3.3% 136.5% 136.5% 143.0% 
Dec-02 -11.0% -10.8% -8.2% 252.2% 252.2% 240.4% 
Jan-03 -1.8% -1.8% 1.2% 175.2% 175.4% 172.6% 
Feb-03 11.6% 11.7% 15.7% 144.5% 144.8% 140.6% 
Mar-03 2.6% 6.5% 11.0% 41.8% 41.8% 37.5% 
Apr-03 7.4% 11.2% 15.6% 143.9% 144.2% 153.8% 
Average 3.4% 5.3% 8.9% 97.0% 102.6% 103.3% 
 
The factors discussed in section 3.3 could have contributed to the inefficient 
BED bid behavior. These include unit commitment, operational limits, and 
unwillingness to take part in the ERCOT real-time market. Three-part bid (energy, start-
up, and no load cost bid), centralized unit-commitment, day-ahead energy market, and 
the BES market power mitigation approaches discussed in the ERCOT market redesign 
process could be helpful to increase the efficiency of forward decisions and BED 
market. 
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3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, models are developed to estimate the competitive benchmark 
with transmission and operational constraints and how transmission and operational 
constraints affect market prices based on actual market bids. These models are applied 
to simulate the ERCOT real-time energy market for the time period from January 2002 
to April 2003. The results show that the balancing up energy market is relatively 
efficient with an average Lerner Index of 8.9%, and the balancing down market is 
relatively inefficient with an average Lerner Index of 103.3%   
It is observed that operational constraints changed the average BEU index by 
3.6% and average BED index by 0.2% for the test time period. F r the congested 
intervals of the test period, the operational constraints contribute about 4.0% increment 
of the average BEU index and 3.9% increment of the average BED index. Furthermore, 
CSC constraints increased the average BEU index by 14.9% and the average BED index 
by 13.5%. Independence between the CSC and operational constraints is ssumed in the 
above discussion. For the un-congested intervals of the test period, we observe that 
operational constraints increase the average BEU index by 3.6% and the average BED 
index by 0.2%. Both CSC and operational constraints increased the average BEU index 
by 5.5%, and the average BED index by 3.3% for the test period includ ng both 
congested and un-congested intervals. 
In summary, both of the CSC congestion and operational constraints contribute 
to the BES market result during our test period. CSC congestion had more effect on 
market performance than did operational constraints. However, the operational 
constraints and CSC congestion does not contribute much to t e inefficiency of the 
balancing down energy market. The possible market power (bid strategies) related to 
transmission constraints and operational constraints re not considered in this chapter. 
The high bilateral contract volume and high capacity reserve margin could 
contribute to the relatively efficient balancing up energy market. Unit commitment, 
lower generation limits, market power, and the unwillingness of some participants to 
take part in ERCOT balancing down market possibly contributed to the inefficient 
balancing down market performance. 
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CHAPTER 4:  SUPPLY FUNCTION EQUILIBRIUM 
BIDDING STRATEGIES W ITH FORWARD CONTRACTS 
 4.1  INTRODUCTION  
Several characteristics of electricity markets facilitate the excise of market 
power, which includes nearly perfectly inelastic demand, economically prohibitive 
storage, limited generation and transmission capacity, and the requirement that supply 
and demand must balance continuously. Therefore, market power analysis has received 
special attention in electricity markets.   
Non-collusive game theoretical approaches, such as the Cournot, Bertrand, and 
Supply Function Equilibrium models, are widely used to model and analyze market 
power in the restructured electricity markets. However, the appropriateness of the 
assumptions of these models for electricity market hasbeen challenged. In the 
electricity market, every firm offers a price and quantity schedule (supply function) for 
each of its generator or entire output simultaneously to the market operator. The Supply 
Function Equilibrium (SFE) model initialed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) reflect 
these price and quantity schedule in their assumption. Market participants submit a 
price and quantity function (supply or bid function) in their SFE model. At equilibrium, 
no player wants to unilaterally change its supply function in order to maximize its 
profit. The decision variables are the parameters of the supply function, rather than 
simple quantity or price as in the Cournot and Bertrand moels. From the aspect of bid 
rules of electricity markets, SFE models offer a more realistic view of electricity 
markets. 
In addition to offering a more realistic view of electrici y market bidding rules, 
SFE models also have the ability to handle the cases with zero demand elasticity. In 
Cournot models, the market price is determined by the intersection of the aggregate 
quantity offered by all market players and the system demand or residual demand curve. 
If the demand or residual demand elasticity is zero, there will be no solution for Counot 
models. Therefore, specify the residual demand elasticity is critical and necessary for 
the solution of Counot modes. The existence of equilibrium n Cournot models does 
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require the residual demand to be elastic. However, the short-run demand elasticity in 
electricity markets is almost zero, and it is difficult to specify the market demand curve. 
As a result, price predictions from Cournot models depend on assumptions about a 
competitive fringe, and are not reliable. Frame and Joskow (1998) mentioned that they 
are not aware of any significant empirical support for the Cournot model providing 
accurate prediction of prices in an electricity market. Although the Bertrand model does 
not require elastic demand, the Bertrand equilibrium is the same as the perfect 
competitive optimum as long as the market has at least two players with unlimited 
capacity. This does not match the actual market results. 
In contrast, neither demand elasticity nor a competitiv  fringe is necessary for 
the existence of SFE equilibrium. The price and quantity supply functions from players 
creates elasticity of the residual demand faced by each pl yer. Therefore, the existence 
of equilibrium in SFE model does not depend on demand elasticity or a competitive 
fringe. SFE models could deal with the zero demand elasticity case. The price 
predictions from SFE models are generally sensible, which represent an intermediate 
level of competition, lying between the Bertrand and Courn t esults. The application of 
SFE models to the England and Wales electricity market (Green and Newbery (1992), 
and Baldick (2004)) showed that SFE models could predict price that match the 
empirical data reasonably. 
SFE models have been used to analyze firms’ bidding strategies. S nce SFE 
models fit actual bidding rules in electricity spot markets better than Cournot models 
(Allaz and Vila (1993), Powell (1993)), the predicted behaviors should be more 
instructive. Green (1999) analyzed the relationship between th spot market and 
contract market with two generators. Hortacsu and Puller (2004) used an ex-post SFE 
model to examine the bidding behaviors in the ERCOT real-time market from 
September 2001 to July 2002. Anderson and Xu (2002) discuss a symmetric duopoly 
SFE in the case with contracts and price caps. The effects of transmission network on 
firms’ behaviors are analyzed with single period SFE models in small networks in 
Younes and Ilic (1998) and Berry, Hobbs, and Meroney (1999). 
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In this chapter, a linear asymmetric SFE model with transmission constraints is 
proposed to analyze the bidding strategies with forward contracts. The research 
contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, we combine forward contracts, 
transmission constraints, and multi-period strategy (an obligation for firms to bid 
consistently over an extended time horizon such as a day or n hour) into the linear 
asymmetric SFE framework. As an ex-ante model, it can provide qualitative insights 
into firms’ behaviors. Second, the bidding strategies related to Transmission Congestion 
Rights (TCRs) are discussed by interpreting TCRs as a line r combination of forwards. 
Third, the model is a general one in the sense that there is no limitation on the number 
of firms and scale of the transmission network, which can h ve asymmetric linear 
marginal costs. In addition to the theoretical analysis, we apply our model to the 
ERCOT real-time market. Most applications of oligopoly models focus on contract 
markets or day-ahead pool markets (Powell (1993), Von der Fehr, and Harbord (1993), 
De la Torre, Conejo, and Contreras (2003, 2004)). Our model shows that real-time 
market analysis is also valuable even when it is relativ ly small in trading quantity.  
The remainder of this chapter is arranged as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the 
evolution of SFE models and the reasons we choose linear SFEs as our framework to 
analyze the effects of forward contracts on firms’ bidding strategies. Section 4.3 
describes the proposed SFE model with forward contracts. Optimal strategies are 
discussed for both transmission congested and un-congested situations. We briefly 
describe the assumptions of the ERCOT SFE model with forward contracts in Section 
4.4. The application results of our SFE model to the ERCOT real-time balancing energy 
market are also presented in section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes this chapter. 
4.2 EVOLUTION OF SUPPLY FUNCTION EQUILIBRIUM MODELS  
The merits of SFE models mentioned in section 4.1 have attracted many 
researchers to apply them to various issues related to market power in the electricity 
markets. These include the impact of strategic behaviors, market divesture, and 
transmission network on electricity prices. Green and Newbery (1992) firstly applied 
SFE model to the England and Wales (E&W) electricity market to investigate how 
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divestiture will affect the market outcome. Their publicat on attracted a substantial 
interest to the SFE model both in the industry and in academia. Newbery (1998) and 
Green (1999) explored the effects of the contract market on the equilibrium with SFE 
model. Rudkevich (1999) presented a SFE model to analyze the ability of market 
players to adapt their behavior through market observations. Bohn, Klevorick, and 
Stalon (1999) tried to use an SFE model to gain insights into the bidding behavior of 
firms in the California Power Exchange. Ilic (1998) and Berry, Hobbs and Meroney 
(1999) examined how the transmission constraints affects the competition with a SFE 
model. Rudkevich (2002) offered an SFE model to find the effects of different payment 
rules ranging from the one-price to the pay-as-bid market price clearing rules. Baldick 
and Hogan (2002) examined the interaction of capacity constrait , price caps, and the 
length of the time horizon over which bids must remain unchanged on the market price. 
Although the SFE model represents the bid rules of electricity markets more 
realistically, this realism also brings difficulty to find equilibrium at the same time. The 
challenge to solve SFE models is caused by the non-convexity of the optimization 
problem faced by each firm. Without restrictive assumptions  the SFE models and 
powerful algorithms, it is very difficult to find equilibrium. All the published studies 
with SFE models have tended to make assumptions on the number of firms, on the 
nature of production costs, or on the form of the bid functio s to facilitate the solution 
of their models.  
However, these simplified SFE modes face the problem of how to reduce the 
distortion of their representation of electricity markets. Green and Newbery (1992), 
Newbery (1998), and Rudkevitch (1998) restricted the marginal coststo be symmetric, 
with equally sized firms of the same marginal cost. Thehigh degree of symmetry is 
very doubtful in an actual market, because market players normally have asymmetric 
cost structure. Rudkevich (1998) assumed constant marginal cost for generators in their 
analysis. However, actual generator or a portfolio of generators does not have constant 
marginal cost. Baldick and Hogan (2002) found that the assumption of constant 
marginal costs could result in no stable SFEs. 
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Those unrealistic assumptions caused the skeptics about the asserted realism of 
SFE models. To extend the realism merit of SFE models, asymmetric structure was 
proposed and applied by Turnbull (1983), Baldick and Hogan (2002), Baldick, Grant 
and Kahn (2004), and Green (1996, 1999). In Rudkevich (1999) and Green 
(1992,1996), linear marginal cost functions with zero (or all have the same) intercept 
have been assumed for each player. Baldick, Grand, and K hn (2004) questioned the 
plausibility of the equal intercept assumption for electricity markets with heterogeneous 
technologies, including gas as well as coal. B ldick, Grant, and Kahn (2004) introduced 
unequal marginal cost intercepts for linear marginal cost functions into the SFE 
framework.  
The advantage of the linear marginal cost function over the more general form 
in SFE models lies in its ability to handle asymmetric strictures when there are more 
than two players. But the linear marginal cost function d es not guarantee the existence 
and uniqueness of equilibrium without further limitation on supply functions. 
Klemperer and Meyer (1989) showed that the condition for uniqueness of equilibrium is 
the unboundness of load-duration curve. Unfortunately, the load-duration curve is 
bounded in practice. Von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) proposed a model with a step-
like supply function. They showed that for some patterns of demand and allocation of 
capacity among generators there would be no equilibrium in pure strategies. Klemperer 
and Meyer (1989) and Baldick, Grand, and Kahn (2004) showed the case with multiple 
equilibriums.  
The existence of a unique equilibrium is a very important issue in the 
application of any oligopoly game theory, including SFE models. An equilibrium exists 
if there are mutually consistent actions that all market players will not deviate from it in 
order to maximize their profit. Multiple equilibriums could be present when there exist 
several such mutually consistent actions. If the equilibri m could be reached through a 
consistent set of deterministic actions, it is called pure strategy equilibrium. If it can be 
reached through a set of probabilistic actions of players, it i  called mixed strategy 
equilibrium. The practice is more interested in the pure strategy equilibrium. If a unique 
equilibrium exists, it is reasonable to assume that the interactive among market players 
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might eventually drive the market to reach the equilibrium. Therefore, if there is a 
unique equilibrium, the SFE model should be appropriate to predict the likely outcome 
of the market. If there are multiple equilibriums, thecalculated equilibriums could not 
provide a convincing prediction of market outcome (stoft (1997)). 
Even though the practical value of SFE model is challenged by the multiple 
equilibriums problem, it is less problematic when the practic l issues, such as capacity 
constraints, price caps (Holmberg (2004), Baldick, Grant, and Kahn (2004)), or multiple 
time periods are considered (Baldick, Grant, and Kahn (2004)). Green and Newbery 
(1992) note that capacity constraints tend to limit the range of equilibriums. Baldick and 
Hogan (2002) investigated the effect of capacity constraints, price caps, and the length 
of the time horizon over which bids must remain unchanged. They empirically 
confirmed that the range of equilibriums could be very small when there are moderately 
tight capacity constraints and price caps. 
Stability of equilibrium further alleviated the problematic of multiple 
equilibriums in practice (Baldick and Hogan (2002)), because only stable equilibrium 
could be sustained in actual market. For unstable equilibrium, the best responses of the 
players will deviate much from the equilibrium given arbitrarily small perturbations to 
the supply functions from the equilibrium. Unstable equilibrium is not expected in 
practice due to the high uncertainty factors in actual electricity market, such as the 
volatility of demand and transmission outages. 
Baldick and Hogan (2002) not only emphasized the importance of equilibrium 
stability, but also justified the advantage of the linear supply function over other general 
form. They showed that only linear SFEs are stable when t re are no capacity 
constraints and the firms are symmetric with linear marginal costs. Their numerical 
simulations of asymmetric firms showed the circumstances where SFEs that are less 
competitive than the linear SFE are unstable. As well as this merit of stability, the linear 
SFE also has the advantage of being able to handle asymmetric structure with more than 
two strategic players. Since the asymmetric case is more interesting for practical 
applications, the linear SFE turns out to be attractive in practice. Rudkevich (1999) 
presented a model to analyze the ability of players to adapt their behavior through 
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market observations and proved that players characterized with linear marginal costs 
and unconstrained capacities are capable of converging to the linear SFE. Baldick, 
Grant and Khan (2004) applied the linear SFE to the electricity market in England and 
Wales and showed that the linear case seems to fit the ac ual price in the E&W market 
reasonably. 
Through all the above development, linear SFE models have become a good tool 
to understand how market power could be exercised in the electricity market and 
estimate the possible result from market power. The empirical applications of SFE 
models to the England and Wales market and the California market did show their 
helpfulness to understand the mechanism that market power could be exercised and the 
result market power could bring to the markets. Therefore, we choose the linear SFE 
model as the framework to investigate firms’ bidding strategies with forward contracts.  
It is well known that the special features of electricity transmission systems can 
have important effects on the equilibrium solution in electricity market (Berry (1999), 
Hobbs (1999), Oren (1997), Smeers and Jing-Yuan (1997), Cardell (1997)). A central 
contribution of this dissertation is the incorporation of transmission constraints into the 
linear SFE framework. 
In order to test our model, we apply it to simulate the bidding behaviors in the 
ERCOT market, where about 95%-97% of the end energy is traded through bilateral 
contracts. The application is helpful to the ERCOT market, which differs from SMD 
and other electricity markets in many aspects. Some of the findings in other restructured 
markets may not be suitable for the ERCOT market reality because of its different 
market structure. Furthermore, ERCOT is currently undertaking a market redesign 
rulemaking process. Understanding market power issues in its current market is 
important and instructive for this policy process. 
4.3   MODEL FORMULATION  
Market players have both incentive and ability to affect prices in spot markets. 
At close to real time, both supply and demand become inelastic. Electricity cannot be 
stored and generators have limits on how quickly they can be started, and ramped up or 
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down. Because the time-varying wholesale price is neither se n nor paid by end-use 
consumers, suppliers face a nearly vertical demand curve. Therefore, the profit from 
market manipulation is greatly increased as the market moves closer to real time. 
Forward contracts enable buyers and sellers to lock their prices and quantities in 
advance of the real-time, which reduces the profit from increases in real-time prices. 
Hence, forward contracts play an important role in reducing incentives to exercise 
market power and hedging the risk related to the high volatility of prices in real-time 
markets (Powell (1993) and Borenstein (2001)).  
In electricity markets, electric firms compete through both spot market bidding 
and bilateral contract trading. Firms have to consider th ir forward contract positions 
when they make spot market decisions. In this chapter, we propose a linear asymmetric 
Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) model with transmission constraints to develop 
firms’ optimal bidding strategies considering forward contracts. The characteristics of 
firms’ behaviors and the mitigation effects of forward contracts are analyzed for 
different situations under the induced equilibrium conditions. Based on Baldick, Grant, 
and Kahn (2004), Xu, and Yu (2002), Newbery (1998), and Green (1999), the linear 
SFE model with forward contracts is constructed as follows for the transmission un-
congested case in section 4.3.1 and for the transmission congested case in section 4.3.2. 
4.3.1 Transmission un-congested model 
Assume there arem firms. The forward contract obligation for firmj during time 
period T  is denoted as jTF  at forward price 
c
jTP . Each firm },...,1{ mj ∈  submits a bid 
curve that is assumed to apply throughout time period T . The bid curve 
[ ] ],0[,: maxmin jj UPPq →  for time period T  is defined by:  
)()( jjj ppq αβ −= ,     (4.1) 
where minP , maxP , and jU  are the minimum and maximum bid price cap, and generation 
capacity.  
 The total production cost function jC  is assumed to be a convex quadratic 
function, which depends on linear marginal cost functions:  
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jjjjjj qaqdqC +=
25.0)( .    (4.2) 
The system demand curve is assumed to be: 
tt ptND γ−= )( ,     (4.3) 
where )(tN  is the load-time function, representing the load at time Tt ∈ ; γ  is 
related to the demand elasticity.  







)( .     (4.4) 
Since the supply functions are non-decreasing and the market clearing price is 
the same for all players when there is no transmission congestion, this market clearing 
condition maximizes the (revealed) social welfare. 
Therefore, the profit function for firm j  at time t  is: 
)())(()( cjTtjTtjjtjtjt PpFpqCpqp −−−=π .    (4.5) 
At equilibrium, each player’s optimal supply function is the best response to the 
supply functions of its competitors within feasible function space. That is, the 
equilibrium *jq  satisfies: 
))(),(())(),(( *,
**
, tjtjtjtjtjtj pqpqpqpq −− ≥ ππ ,    
where )(* tj pq−  represents competitors’ supply functions.  
Because forward contracts are decided before the spot market, spot market 
prices cannot directly affect the forward contract obligation jTF  and the forward price 
c
























.  (4.6) 
Setting (4.6) equal to zero to obtain the optimal price using the market clearing 




















** .  (4.7) 
Substituting (4.1) and (4.2), we have: 






kjjtjjtjTjtj apdpFp βγαβαβ .  (4.8) 
A solution to coupled condition (4.8) of all firms is an SFE.  
Since the bid function is required to be consistent during period T , equation 
(4.8) should be satisfied for the realized prices during that time period. If there are at 
least two levels of demand cleared during the period T , then there will be at least two 
prices realized and (4.8) will be satisfied as an identity as Baldick, Grant, and Kahn 
(2004). Consequently, the coefficient of pricetp  on the left hand and right hand of (4.8) 
should be equal, and similarly the constant term should be equal. Therefore, the 












kjjjjjTjj daF ))(( βγαβαβ , j∀ .  (4.10) 







α , j∀ .    (4.11) 
 From (4.9) and (4.11), we observe that the slope of the SFE does not depend on 
the amount of forward contract jTF , but the intercept jα  does depend on jTF . When 
0=jTF , the intercept of a firm’s SFE is equal to the intercept of its marginal cost 
function: 
jj a=α , j∀ .     (4.12) 





j FCFdaF ′=+=+ β
α ,  j∀ .  (4.13) 
This means the SFE will intersect the marginal cost function at the position of the 
contract obligation, which is consistent with the observations in Green (1999), Newbery 
(1998), and Anderson and Xu (2002). 
Figure 4.1 shows the SFEs for the above cases. The marginal cost function is 
shown in the Figure as MC. SF1 is for the no-forward contract case, which has the same 
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intercept as the marginal cost function MC, but a different slope. For the case with 
forward contracts, we denote the quantity of forward contracts as TF . B denotes the 
point on MC with quantity TF . SF2 represents the SFE for the contracted case, which 
goes through B and has the same slope as SF1. 
In Figure 4.1, forward contracts move the SFE downward by the distance 
between A and B, which indicates the market power mitigation effects of forward 
contracts. From Figure 4.1, we can see that the greater the amounts of forward 
contracts, the more mitigation effects. However, we observe that strategic firms still bid 
at a higher price than their marginal cost to sell energy in excess of their contracted 
quantity and at a lower price than their marginal cost to buy energy from the spot 
market, which is consistent with the findings in (Green (1999) and Newbery (1998)).  
Figure 4.1:  Supply Functions with Forward Contracts 
4.3.2 Transmission Congested model 
We still use the DC power flow model discussed in Chapter 3 to represent the 
transmission network. Assume there aren  nodes and K  transmission lines in the 
system. Firms are indexed by the node numbers of their locations. If there are multiple 
generation firms at a node, artificial nodes could be defined. Therefore, we can assume 
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them at different nodes from generators. Nodal angles, nodal generation, nodal load and 
transmission capacities are denoted by vectors   ,q , D , and maxFL , respectively.  
Then, as in Chapter 3, the DC power flow and transmis ion capacity constraints 
are: 
 maxFLD)S(q ≤− ,       
where, 1−= HBS , B  is the imaginary part of the nodal admittance matrix, H  is the 
product of the branch susceptance diagonal matrix and an appropriate incidence matrix 
of branches with nodes.  
We maintain the same assumptions for firms as in Section 4.3.1, except that we 
use nodal prices, since the nodal price will be different if there is any transmission line 





+=+= 1 ,    (4.14) 
where jj βκ /1= . 
 Each firm’s decision process has to consider the market-clearing process of the 
system operator, which is constrained by transmission capacities and firms’ generation 
limits. The problem is described as the following bi-level optimization process: 
jMax π        (4.15) 





















0)( ,     (4.17) 
max)( FLDqS ≤− ,                                                             (4.18) 
 maxqq0 ≤≤ ,             (4.19) 
 Model (4.16)-(4.19) describes the market clearing process performed by the 
system operator, which is to maximize system welfar (or minimize negative welfare) 
constrained by system supply and demand balance (4.17), transmission capacities (4.18) 
and firms’ generation limits (4.19).  
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 We assume that when bidding into the spot market, it is known whether or not a 
line is going to be constrained based on the forward contract decisions and other 
information that becomes available before the spot market. In contrast, if the 
binding/non-binding determination is endogenous, generally speaking, there will not be 
a pure strategy equilibrium in either the Cournot or SFE framework. Mixed strategy 
equilibrium approaches could be applied to deal with the endogenous case, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Here we assume that the information about binding 
constraints is exogenous. Therefore, we can include only the binding constraints in the 
formulation of the Lagrangian for the market clearing problem and treat binding 
constraints as equality constraints. In order to highlight forward contracts and 
transmission constraints, we do not consider generator capacity limits here. Then the 
Lagrangian for the market clearing problem is: 

















FLq(S  −+−+−=  
==
λ ,  (4.20) 
where λ  and b
  are Lagrange multiplier vectors for the system balance constraint and 
binding transmission constraints, respectively, and bS  and maxbFL  are the shift factor 
matrix and capacity limit vector for the known binding transmission constraints. Vector 
Dqq −=ˆ  represents the net nodal injection.  















































,    (4.21) 
where   is a diagonal matrix consisting of the slopes of inverse SFEs and consumer 
marginal benefit functions,   is a vector containing the intercepts , 1 is a vector with all 
elements equal to 1. Equation (4.21) can be simplified as: 
gwz = .     (4.22) 
According to Xu and Yu (2002), the sensitivity of the optimal solution *z  with 
respect to the slope of supply function for firmj  is: 
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*1* / zIwz jj
−−=∂∂ κ ,    (4.23) 
 jj 1wz
1* / −−=∂∂ α ,    (4.24) 
where jI  is a square matrix with 1 for its j th diagonal element and 0 for other 
elements, and j1  is a vector with only one non-zero element of 1 for elementj .  












,    (4.25) 
jjjjtq ξα −=∂∂ /* ,    (4.26) 
where jjξ is the j th diagonal element of 1−w .  
The profit function for firm j  is: 
c
TjTjtjjtjjTjtjjtjjt PFqaqdFqq +−−−+=
25.0))(( ακπ  .  (4.27) 
By (4.25) and (4.26), the first order conditions of (4.27) are:  
0)]()2[( ***2* =−−−+−−=∂∂ jtjTjtjjjjTjjjtjjjtjjt qFqFaqdq ξκακκπ , (4.28) 
 
0)]()2[( ** =−−−+−−=∂∂ jTjjjjTjjjtjjjtjjt FFaqdq ξκακαπ .  (4.29) 
Rearranging (4.28) and (4.29), we get: 
 
0)())2(1(( **2* =−−−−−− jtjTjtjjjjTjjjtjjjj qFqFaqd ξκαξκ ,    (4.30) 
0)())2(1( * =−−−−−− jtjjjjtjjjtjjjj FFaqd ξκαξκ .  (4.31) 
Note that these equations should be satisfied for all time during period T . 
Assume that at least two different dispatches happen durig time period T . Comparing 
(4.30) to (4.31), we observe that (4.30) will be satisfied as long as (4.31) is satisfied. 
Similar to the un-congested case, we assume that at least two different dispatches are 
realized during period T . Then by setting, respectively, the coefficients of *jtq  and the 
constant term of (4.31) to zero and rearranging, we obtain equilibrium conditions: 
  0)2(1 =−− jjjj d ξκ ,     (4.32) 
)( jjjTjj dFa −−= κα ,    (4.33) 
where we have used (4.32) to simplify the terms in (4.33).  
 84  
 By comparing (4.32) and (4.9), we observe that the transmission constraints 
affect the slopes of the SFEs. However, forward contracts do not affect the slopes of the 
SFEs for both the transmission un-congested and the transmission congested cases. 
Comparing (4.11) and (4.33), we observe that the intercepts are imilar, which means 
forward contracts have similar effects on the intercepts of SFEs for the transmission 
congested case as for the transmission un-congested case. 
 By checking (4.32) and (4.33), we found the slope of SFE does n t change with 
forward contracts, but the intercept will change. When 0=jTF , the intercept of a firm’s 
SFE equals to the intercept of its marginal cost function: 
jj a=α .      (4.34) 
Rearranging (4.34) yields: 
)( jTjTjjjTjj FCFdaF ′=+=+ κα .    (4.35) 
This means SFE will intersect the marginal cost functio at the position of the 
contract obligation. Therefore, forward contracts have th  same effects on firms’ 
optimal strategy for transmission-congested case as for the un-congested case that was 
discussed in Section 4.3.1.  
An iterative method can be developed based on (4.32) and (4.33)to calculate the 
SFEs with transmission congestion under forward contracts. But we should note that the 
binding transmission constraints are assumed not to change during the iteration. 
Otherwise, this method will fail to converge, which indicates that the SFE does not exist 
in strict sense. 
In electricity markets, Transmission Congestion Rights (TCRs) are a special 
form of forward contracts provided for market participants to hedge the risk of 
congestion prices. A TCR entitles its holder to get payment based on the difference 
between nodal prices or the shadow price on the congested line. Therefore, the profit of 








)( ,     (4.36) 
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where jir  is related to the quantity of firmj ’s TCR involving node i . If the net 
TCR ownership involving node i is from other nodes to node i , then jir  is positive. 
Otherwise, it is negative.  
The profit function for firm j  with TCRs is: 
)(5.0)( 2 tjjtjjtjjtjjtjjt pTqaqdqq +−−+= ακπ .  (4.37) 
The conditions for SFE can be obtained following similar steps to the case for 
forward contracts. That is, analogously to (4.30) and (4.31), we have: 




itijijijtjjjijjjtjjjtjjjj qrqraqrqd ξκξκαξκ , (4.38) 




ijijijjjjjjjjjtjjjj rrarqd ξκξκαξκ ,   (4.39) 
where ijξ  is the element of 1−w at (i , j ) position.  
By (4.38) and (4.39), we found that the slope and intercept of a firm’s SFE are 
affected by its TCR shares. Here we only discuss the simplest case to illustrate possible 
strategies related to TCRs. It is assumed that jiij ≠∀= ,0ξ . This assumption means 
firm j has very little effect on the prices of nodes except the node i  where it is located. 
Therefore, we can ignore the terms related to nodes ther than nodej in (4.38) and 
(4.39), and the slope of SFE is the same as (4.32), but the intercept changes to:  
)( jjjjjj dra −+= κα .    (4.40) 
As a result, if jjr >0, it may be profitable for the firm to increase th  intercept of 
its SFE to increase the TCR value by increasing the shadow price. In contrast, if jjr <0, 
it may be profitable for the firm to decrease its intercept. 
Now we assume that firmj owns generation units on both nodej  and node k , 
and owns a TCR from nodej  to node k . We now assume that the firm cannot 
significantly affect the prices at nodes kji ,≠ . The shadow price on line from nodej to 
nodek  is related to )( jk pp −  so that 0<jjr , 0>jkr . Analogously to the previous case, 
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the firm may increase the intercept of its SFE at nodek  and decrease its intercept of 
SFE at node j to increase the shadow price on the line and therefore increase its profit. 
 4.4  APPLICATION  
Since most of energy is traded through bilateral contract markets in the ERCOT 
wholesale market, it is instructive to apply the proposed SFE model with forward 
contracts to the ERCOT real-time BES market to gaininsight into bidding behaviors of 
market participants under forward contracts. In this section, we discuss the assumptions 
for the application of the proposed SFE model to simulate the ERCOT market. Then the 
simulation results are presented and discussed. The relat d information to the software 
in this application is provided in the appendix. 
4.4.1 Assumptions about ERCOT SFE model with forward contracts 
1) Forward Contract 
The ERCOT market design encourages forward transactions between market 
participants. The real time energy accounts only 3%- 5% of the end energy 
consumption. Without considering forward contracts, the SFE model of the ERCOT 
real-time market will overestimate the effect of olig poly market power.  
When we consider the effect of forward contracts, we assume the profit from 
forward contracts is not affected by real-time market prices. It is because the forward 
contract prices are set before the real-time market. The long-term effect of real-time 
market on the forward contract is not considered in this dissertation. However, it can be 
extended in the future research based on the theoretical framework developed in section 
4.3. The balancing energy bid activities of a player d pends only on their profit or cost 
from selling or buying BES in the real-time market. Under this assumption, a 
competitive supplier would like to sell their excess capacity excluding their forward 
contract to the BES market if MCPE is higher than its cost, and would like to buy 
energy from the BES market to satisfy its contracted load obligation if the MCPE is 
below its costs. 
Unfortunately, there is no public resource about the actual forward contract 
positions of firms in ERCOT. We assume the schedules submitted by QSEs match their 
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forward contracts between generation resources and LSEs. However, schedules could 
be manipulated to affect MCPEs. In this case, our SFE model will underestimate the 
effect of market power.  
2) Strategic Players 
In a perfectly competitive BES market, a firm should bid their marginal cost 
around its contract obligation as its BEU and BED bids. If a firm has market power, it 
can be expected to bid higher BEU price than marginl cost for offer in excess of its 
forward contracts to sell energy and bid BED price lower than marginal cost to buy 
energy as we discussed in Section 4.3. 
Some firms could have market power and are able to affect the price level of the 
market. So firm-level oligopoly analysis will be helpful to understand their behaviors 
and market results. However, the firm-level scheduls and bids information are not 
available. Schedules and bids are submitted by QSEs in the ERCOT BES market. A 
QSE can represent more than one firm and submit schedules and bids for them. Since 
the schedules and bids in ERCOT are submitted as aggregates by QSEs, we identify 
QSEs as the market players even though a QSE can represent more than one firm.  
Major strategic players are identified by their actual BES bid and deployment 
shares. Table 4.1 shows the average bid and deployment shares for the major four QSEs 
from January 2002 to April 2003 in the ERCOT real-time balancing energy market. The 
bid share is the percentage of the bid quantity from a specific QSE divided by the total 
system bid quantity, which is based on the hourly bid curves submitted by QSEs. The 
deployment share is the percentage of the quantity deployed to a specific QSE over the 
total system deployed quantity, which is based on the actual first-step deployment 
information. Because the MCPEs are decided based on the first-step portfolio 
deployment during our test time period, unit specific deployments in the second-step for 
local congestion management is not considered.  
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Table 4.1:  Bid and Deployment Shares 
BEU Shares BED Shares QSE Name 
Bid Deployment Bid Deployment 
TXU 44.7% 24.8% 25.1% 13.1% 
Texas Genco 24.8% 21.2% 28.2% 35.1% 
Calpine 5.1% 14.6% 7.3% 12.4% 
AEP 8.6% 8.8% 9.8% 3.3% 
Others 16.9% 30.8% 29.6% 36.2% 
Figure 4.2:  BED Bid Shares 
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Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 shows the monthly average BED and BEU bid shares 
for the four biggest QSEs. Table 4.1 shows that the four biggest QSEs account for about 
83.2% of bid capacity for BEU on average and about 70.4% for BED on average. They 
supply about 69.2% BEU and 63.8% BED demand on average in the BES market 
during the test period. The other 44 QSEs contribute only about 16.9% and 29.6% of 
BEU and BED bid capacity, respectively. They supply about 30.8% BEU and 36.2% 
BED demand. Since they consist of a bunch of small players, they should be 
represented as a competitive player. However, by the weighted average bid prices of 
these players, we found that some of them bid high BEU price and low BED price. In 
addition, we find that the assumption about these players to be a competitive fringe or a 
strategic player does not change the result much beaus  of their small market share. 
Therefore, we represent those other QSEs as one strat gic player in the SFE model. The 
monthly average BES bid shares and weighted average (WAVG) bid prices for some 
QSEs in ERCOT during our test time period are summarized in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2:  Bid Shares and WAVG Bid Price ($/MWh) of QSEs 







TXU 44.7% 65 25.1% 1 
Texas GenCo 24.8% 82 28.2% -5 
American Electric Power 8.6% 44 9.8% -27 
Calpine Power Mangement 5.1% 46 7.3% -210 
Coral Power 2.6% 43 3.8% -52 
ANP 1.8% 28 3.1% -257 
Lower Colorado River Authority 1.6% 55 3.6% -20 
Automated Power Exchange 1.6% 56 2.9% -367 
FPL Energy 1.6% 32 1.7% -182 
Dynegy Power 1.2% 43 2.2% -44 
Mirant Americas 1.0% 170 1.9% -261 
FPLE 0.8% 33 1.1% -213 
Aquila Energy 0.5% 26 2.0% -223 
City of Garland 0.4% 46 0.8% 4 
South Texas Electric Coop 0.2% 30 0.4% -60 
PG and Energy Trading 0.1% 177 0.5% -10 
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Actually the major four QSEs represent the five biggest firms in ERCOT, 
including TXU generation company, Reliant energy, Calpine, City Public Service of 
San Antonio (CPS), and Central power and light (CPL) which is an affiliate of 
American Electric Power. Texas GenCo includes both reliant and CPS. American 
Electric Power (AEP) includes CPL in its portfolio. These five firms consist about 24%, 
18%, 8%, 6%, and 5% of the system installed capacity, respectively. We tried our SFE 
model with 3-8 players, the results keep consistent and the differences is within 1%. 
3) Demand 
Most of the SFE models in the literature focus on the Pool market or the day-
ahead market. In this kind of market, the load duration curve (Klemperer and Meyer 
(1989), Green and Newbery (1992)) is used to characterize electricity demand over a 
day. In the real-time market, it is hard for load duration curve to capture the high 
volatility of balancing energy demand. The BES consists of only small part of system 
end energy consumed. Table 4.3 shows the monthly statistics of BES percentage over 
total system energy consumption in ERCOT. There is uncertainty imbedded in how 
much BES will be deployed and whether BEU or BED will be deployed. Figure 4.3 and 
Figure 4.4 shows the monthly BES deployed quantity and number of intervals for BEU 
and BED deployment. That is, instead of a load duration curve, a probability 
distribution is appropriate to represent the variation of demand in the real-time market, 
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Table 4.3:  BES Percentage of System Energy 
Mean Min Max Month 
BEU BED BEU BED BEU BED 
Jan-02 2.5% 1.7% 0.4% 0.2% 4.5% 4.7% 
Feb-02 1.4% 1.9% 0.2% 0.4% 4.7% 5.5% 
Mar-02 1.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.5% 4.9% 7.5% 
Apr-02 0.6% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 5.4% 
May-02 0.7% 3.0% 0.0% 0.2% 5.0% 8.7% 
Jun-02 0.9% 2.1% 0.1% 0.9% 3.0% 4.5% 
Jul-02 2.1% 1.2% 0.2% 0.1% 4.7% 4.1% 
Aug-02 1.9% 1.0% 0.3% 0.1% 3.4% 3.3% 
Sep-02 1.9% 1.1% 0.6% 0.1% 3.6% 2.8% 
Oct-02 1.8% 1.1% 0.0% 0.3% 4.6% 6.6% 
Nov-02 2.3% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 3.9% 3.5% 
Dec-02 2.3% 0.8% 0.5% 0.1% 4.0% 2.8% 
Jan-03 2.2% 1.0% 0.4% 0.0% 5.4% 3.1% 
Feb-03 5.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 11.0% 1.4% 
Mar-03 3.4% 2.0% 0.3% 0.0% 10.7% 5.9% 
Apr-03 2.0% 1.7% 0.4% 0.3% 4.5% 5.9% 
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Figure 4.5:  BES Daily Deployment Interval Number 
The real-time balancing energy demand depends on many factors, such as the 
generation schedules, load schedules, the ISO’s load f recasts, ancillary services 
purchased and deployed, and automatic system frequency control system. In addition, 
system demand has to be satisfied at real-time to maintain system reliability. There is no 
demand elasticity at real-time. Therefore, we use the actual balancing energy demand 
for each interval during our test period for the demand in the model assuming that the 
demand realizations have been drawn from a random distribution. 
4) Marginal Cost Functions 
The production cost of each major QSE is based on the units within its portfolio. 
Since more than 90% of QSEs’ installed capacities consist of fossil fuel units, we only 
consider fossil fuel units to construct the production cost functions for QSEs. As in 
Chapter 3, the output from other kinds of units, including nuclear, hydro, and wind 
units, are deducted from the respective portfolio schedule, and their effects on CSCs are 
based on their output.  
For fossil fuel generation units, the production cost f r each unit is based on the 
fuel price and its average heat rate as in Chapter 3. The average heat rate for each unit in 
ERCOT is obtained from (Henwood (2002), EPA (2002), and PUCT (2002)). The gas 
prices are obtained from the Market Oversight Division (MOD) at the Public Utility 
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unit is based on its installed capacity considering its forced outage probability (NERC 
(2002)).  
The intercept and slope for a QSE’s marginal cost function are obtained by 
linearly approximating its marginal cost curve. For the QSEs with both coal and gas 
units, piece-wise linear marginal cost functions are constructed to capture the cost jump 
from coal to gas technology with two sets of parameters for coal and gas units 
respectively.  
However, the linear marginal function does not capture the rapid increase in 
marginal cost at high output close to the maximum capa ity. Since ERCOT has high 
capacity reserve margin, the capacity limits normally re not constrained. So the linear 
approximation for the part close to the capacity limit will not affect the result much. No 
attempt is made to capture the operating, planned maintenance, environmental cost, and 
ancillary services purchased in ERCOT day-ahead market. Those factors could result in 
underestimation of the marginal costs.  
5) Capacity Limits 
In the ERCOT BES market, the maximum BEU capacity a QSE can supply is its 
maximum installed generation capacity minus its scheduled generation. The maximum 
BED capacity a QSE can supply is its scheduled generation quantity5. Actually QSEs 
bid only part of their available BES capacity, less than 15% for BEU and 30% on 






                                                
5 Relaxed balanced schedule allows QSEs to schedule more generation than their actual needs resulting in 
some of the scheduled generation be used in the BES market. 
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Table 4.4:  QSEs Bid Percentage (Bid Quantity/Capacity) 
TXU GenCo AEP Calpine Others Month 
BEU BED BEU BED BEU BED BEU BED BEU BED 
Jan-02 13.3% 28.2% 8.9% 30.2% 10.3% 28.2% 4.4% 11.1% 4.9% 19.6% 
Feb-02 13.2% 24.2% 6.9% 32.5% 9.3% 26.6% 4.1% 9.6% 3.3% 20.2% 
Mar-02 12.8% 26.5% 4.9% 26.5% 10.6% 24.7% 3.3% 15.0% 6.7% 24.8% 
Apr-02 12.1% 27.1% 6.9% 25.2% 12.0% 29.7% 3.7% 15.1% 7.6% 22.9% 
May-02 14.0% 23.2% 6.3% 20.9% 13.3% 30.9% 6.5% 16.3% 10.4% 28.7% 
Jun-02 16.3% 20.4% 5.7% 16.8% 16.5% 29.6% 9.6% 18.8% 13.4% 34.1% 
Jul-02 19.0% 20.4% 8.6% 16.0% 15.0% 32.9% 14.8% 16.2% 14.1% 34.6% 
Aug-02 20.9% 19.4% 11.2% 16.2% 19.5% 31.8% 13.9% 16.8% 15.0% 31.4% 
Sep-02 17.6% 21.2% 9.3% 14.0% 20.1% 28.0% 8.9% 16.9% 13.1% 31.8% 
Oct-02 13.4% 24.9% 5.4% 15.8% 5.3% 23.6% 9.4% 16.7% 9.5% 29.0% 
Nov-02 11.1% 25.0% 4.4% 18.0% 2.3% 26.8% 8.8% 17.9% 8.9% 25.9% 
Dec-02 11.4% 23.3% 5.1% 16.1% 3.4% 17.3% 10.4% 19.0% 7.8% 34.8% 
Jan-03 14.6% 20.2% 5.1% 19.0% 3.0% 28.6% 12.2% 23.3% 6.9% 23.1% 
Feb-03 18.3% 22.4% 4.0% 20.3% 3.8% 27.8% 10.5% 24.1% 9.3% 23.2% 
Mar-03 15.9% 30.5% 2.5% 20.0% 3.7% 29.3% 8.1% 23.6% 8.1% 21.6% 
Apr-03 12.4% 24.7% 3.4% 16.2% 2.3% 33.6% 5.5% 25.1% 7.2% 22.3% 
Average 14.8% 23.8% 6.2% 20.2% 9.4% 28.1% 8.4% 17.8% 9.2% 26.8% 
 
The small bid capacities may be a sigh of physical withholding. However, firms 
might have reasons for not bidding all their BES capacity, such as unit commitment 
decisions, operation preference, and fuel supply limitations. In order to avoid detailed 
consideration of these factors, we assume the actual bid quantity of each QSE is its 
actual available quantity considering all its indivi ual conditions. When we relax bid 
limits based on their installed capacity and schedules, the changes of our SFE price 
results are less than 3%, because only about 17% and 23% on average of the BEU and 
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Table 4.5:  Percentage of Deployed BES/Bid Quantity 
BED BEU Month 
Average Max Min Average Max Min 
Jan-02 17.6% 65.9% 2.2% 21.2% 64.7% 2.2% 
Feb-02 14.6% 57.5% 1.9% 20.4% 96.4% 1.2% 
Mar-02 14.5% 89.4% 0.6% 17.9% 90.8% 2.0% 
Apr-02 21.2% 56.5% 2.4% 20.6% 67.8% 2.1% 
May-02 19.6% 70.7% 1.8% 19.3% 62.3% 1.9% 
Jun-02 15.8% 51.3% 1.9% 21.2% 80.6% 2.6% 
Jul-02 17.6% 53.3% 3.6% 27.2% 74.6% 2.6% 
Aug-02 17.3% 43.9% 4.2% 23.8% 84.2% 1.6% 
Sep-02 18.1% 38.9% 5.0% 20.3% 72.5% 3.5% 
Oct-02 18.7% 44.4% 6.3% 22.8% 96.8% 4.8% 
Nov-02 17.2% 79.2% 4.1% 21.7% 72.8% 5.1% 
Dec-02 18.4% 65.6% 2.8% 24.1% 83.8% 2.7% 
Jan-03 14.4% 64.0% 2.2% 20.2% 77.7% 1.8% 
Feb-03 9.9% 41.7% 2.1% 29.3% 93.6% 2.5% 
Mar-03 19.1% 94.7% 2.9% 23.9% 99.9% 1.6% 
Apr-03 16.5% 61.8% 2.2% 24.3% 90.3% 2.7% 
Average 17.4% 94.7% 0.6% 23.0% 99.9% 1.2% 
 
6) Transmission Congestion 
Transmission congestion is a source of market power. In the ERCOT SFE 
model, we consider only the CSC congestion, because MCPEs depend on CSC 
congestion, not local congestion during our test time period. Monthly zonal weighted 
average shift factors are used to represent the effect of zonal generation and load on 
CSCs. 
The ERCOT ISO publishes the possible binding constraints before real-time 
based on the information submitted to the ISO from QSEs. We assume that the real-
time market has a small enough effect so that no expected non-binding constraints will 
become binding due to balancing deployment. Therefore we assume that it is known in 
advance whether or not a line is going to be constrained in the real-time market, and 
only include binding constraints in (4.21) for the ERCOT application. 
Although allocations of TCRs and PCRs can affect market power related to 
congestion as we discussed in Section 4.3.2, there is no public resource of information 
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about them in ERCOT. We assume a QSE’s TCR shares are consistent with its forward 
contracts. However, its actual TCR shares may be higher or lower than its forward 
contracts, which may result in underestimation or overestimation of market power for 
the congested cases. The generators of each major QSE player in each zone are treated 
as one player for the congested case.  
4.4.2 Results 
In the application of the proposed SFE model to simulate the ERCOT real-time 
market, an hourly supply function is formed for each of the major players based on (4.9) 
and (4.11) for transmission un-congested hours and (4.32) and (4.33) for transmission 
congested hours during January 2002 to April 2003. For every 15 minutes interval, the 
market is cleared according to market clearing condition (4.4). When some BEU bid 
prices are lower than some BED bid prices (called overlap) (ERCOT (2002b)), they are 
cancelled against each other to ensure that most efficient resources are deployed. There 
was overlap for about 43% of intervals during the test period. 
Some intervals were excluded from the calculation in order to avoid the 
influence of abnormal events, such as forced outages, software failures, and operational 
errors (ERCOT (2003a)). There are a total of 464 intervals excluded from the total 
46560 intervals for the testing time period, which account for only about 0.9 % of the 
total test intervals. 
The simulation was performed with Matlab 6.5 on a Linux workstation with a 
1.8GHZ Xeon processor. All information related to cngestion, transmission limits, 
actual market prices, demand, and schedules are available at (ERCOT (2003a)). The 
computation took less than 0.1 second on average for an un-congested case, and about 
28 seconds on average for a congested case. 
1) Transmission un-congested case 
There are about 83% of intervals without transmission congestion during our 
test period. The monthly weighted average marginal cost (MC), the estimated SFE 
prices for non-contracted case (SFE_NC) and contracted ase (SFE_C), and the actual 
market prices are listed in Table 4.6 for the transmis ion un-congested cases.  Table 4.6 
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also shows weighted average price (WAP) and the weight d average percentage of 
price-cost margin (PC Margin) over the test time period. Since the no-contracted case is 
a pure pool market case, only BEU would be deployed in such a market. Therefore, the 
no-contracted case is only listed for the BEU market for these transmission un-
congested cases. 
 From Table 4.6, we see that forward contracts decrease estimated SFE price-
cost margin by 13.3%, from 17.3% to 4.0%, which indicates the market power 
mitigation effect of forward contracts. The counter-factual SFE BEU non-contracted 
prices are usually higher than both the SFE contracted prices and the actual market 
prices. Comparing contracted SFE prices with the actual market prices, we find that the 
average SFE BEU contracted price of $51.10/MWh matches the average actual market 
price of  $53.17/MWh very well, with a -3.9% difference between them.  
Table 4.6:  Results of SFE Transmission Un-congested Case 
BEU ($/MWh) BED ($/MWh) 
Month 
MC SFE_NC SFE_C Actual MC SFE_C Actual 
Jan-02 21.22 24.93 20.97 21.11 22.04 20.84 7.71 
Feb-02 21.73 27.98 21.74 21.10 22.09 20.78 9.89 
Mar-02 28.17 34.57 28.20 32.77 27.52 26.38 13.22 
Apr-02 33.73 40.46 33.89 35.94 31.51 29.47 17.48 
May-02 32.69 38.75 33.62 34.52 32.95 31.81 15.17 
Jun-02 33.21 41.56 34.64 33.67 31.72 30.58 16.75 
Jul-02 30.82 39.38 32.38 32.86 29.31 28.25 16.64 
Aug-02 30.98 39.90 32.45 30.46 31.24 30.38 17.22 
Sep-02 34.93 42.41 35.74 31.82 33.78 33.24 14.95 
Oct-02 37.82 43.74 38.30 41.71 34.39 33.84 17.16 
Nov-02 36.54 40.52 36.44 35.35 34.11 34.48 14.00 
Dec-02 43.57 48.83 43.80 40.23 39.97 40.40 11.73 
Jan-03 51.81 60.20 53.00 52.50 48.44 47.79 17.74 
Feb-03 86.74 101.47 92.94 103.54 46.39 48.23 19.26 
Mar-03 67.08 76.32 69.58 71.81 42.39 41.57 30.73 
Apr-03 50.57 58.54 52.46 57.85 40.73 43.54 15.16 
WAP 49.14 57.64 51.10 53.17 33.37 32.58 16.16 
PC Margin - 17.3% 4.0% 8.2% - 2.4% -51.6% 
 
Several factors may contribute to the difference. First, firms’ actual bids could 
involve a much more complicated asset optimization process than the SFE model. A 
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firm can include their fuel supply, environmental constraints, forced or planned outage, 
volatility of demand, and operational issues into consideration.  In addition, their actual 
marginal cost and bid curves could be more complicated than our linear supply 
functions. We assume each QSE is one player, which may actually include several 
competing firms. The ERCOT ISO considers operational constraints such as ramp rate 
in the market clearing process, which we do not consider because this information is not 
available publicly. The relatively low price cost margin (8.2%) of the actual BEU price 
indicates an efficient BEU market performance. 
In contrast, the average SFE BED price of $32.58/MWh does not fit the actual 
BED price of $16.16/MWh well. The relatively lower actual BED price indicates that 
some participants do not want to decrease generation in the real-time market compared 
to their forward contract position or schedule. In our SFE model, we assume that market 
players are indifferent to forward and spot markets, and they will buy energy from real-
time market if there is cheaper suppliers available. However, it turns out that some 
market participants submitted low BED bids in order to avoid buying energy from real-
time market, even when there are cheaper resources available in the real-time market. 
The relatively low price cost margin (-51.6%) of actual BED price suggests an 
inefficient BED market performance. 
2) Transmission congested case 
There are about 16.7% transmission congested intervals during our test period. 
Results for the congested intervals are shown in Table 4.7. Table 4.7 shows similar 
market mitigation effects of forward contracts, decreasing SFE price-cost margin by 
15.4% from 21.8% down to 6.4%, as observed for the transmission un-congested cases. 
The difference between the average estimated SFE contra ted price of $37.91/MWh and 
actual BEU price of $43.05/MWh is about -11.9%, while the difference between 
average SFE BED contracted price of $29.02/MWh and ctual BED price of 
$16.09/MWh is 80.4%. These differences between the estimated contracted SFE prices 
and the actual market prices are somewhat larger than for the transmission un-congested 
cases, and the price cost margins are slightly different. 
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Several factors could contribute to the different ra es. CSC congestion, as 
discussed in Section 4.3 is an obvious one. In addition, we did not consider the effects 
of TCR or PCR assignment because this information is not available publicly. However, 
as we discussed in section 4.3, players may increase or decrease their BES bids to 
maximize their profit from both energy trading and TCRs. Then the SFE prices 
considering TCRs could be higher for the BEU and lower for the BED than the SFE 
prices without considering TCRs shown in Table 4.7. Therefore, if the TCRs 
information is available, the gap between our SFE results and actual market prices for 
the congested case may be improved. 
Table 4.7:  Results of SFE Transmission Congested Case 
BEU ($/MWh) BED($/MWh) 
Month 
MC SFE_NC SFE_C Actual MC SFE_C Actual 
Jan-02 21.06 24.50 21.04 24.23 22.30 19.72 4.97 
Feb-02 21.57 27.05 27.98 35.78 21.76 19.28 9.11 
Mar-02 28.32 35.19 28.76 30.45 27.90 24.23 12.28 
Apr-02 35.51 45.61 37.17 79.77 32.59 28.26 17.33 
May-02 33.59 39.23 33.98 33.32 35.23 31.21 16.73 
Jun-02 33.31 42.37 35.57 36.82 32.37 31.99 19.48 
Jul-02 30.72 39.62 32.98 33.58 29.56 28.72 16.41 
Aug-02 32.55 43.12 35.00 34.28 31.37 31.01 19.56 
Sep-02 35.49 45.18 38.32 38.53 35.71 35.04 18.47 
Oct-02 40.05 51.38 43.43 52.57 36.33 31.20 23.22 
Nov-02 33.01 39.90 39.01 40.10 30.42 19.17 15.84 
Dec-02 43.87 49.00 44.46 41.44 41.69 43.79 29.54 
Jan-03 54.61 65.17 56.99 52.23 49.69 47.68 20.51 
Feb-03 75.13 85.32 78.98 63.93 57.70 56.90 26.97 
Mar-03 64.61 73.06 67.18 86.19 47.27 45.23 36.72 
Apr-03 50.08 58.98 52.79 74.77 47.59 45.45 22.90 
WAP 35.63 43.39 37.91 43.05 31.29 29.02 16.09 
PC Margin - 21.8% 6.4% 20.8% - 7.3% -48.6% 
 
Although SFE prices deviate from the actual market prices by different amounts 
for the congested intervals and for the un-congested intervals, the overall weighted 
average SFE BEU contracted price of $49.00/MWh still matches the actual BEU price 
of $51.56/MWh well for the whole test period as shown in Table 4.8. It is because the 
congested intervals account for only about 15% of the all intervals during the test time. 
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In contrast, the estimated SFE BED average price of $31.87/MWh is not close to the 
actual BED price of $16.15/MWh. The overall price cost margin for the BEU and BED 
actual prices are 9.8% and –50.9% respectively, which indicate relatively efficient BEU 
market and inefficient BED market performance respectiv ly in the ERCOT balancing 
energy market during the test time period.  
Table 4.8:  Results of SFE for the Test Period 
BEU ($/MWh) BED($/MWh) 
Month 
MC SFE_NC SFE_C Actual MC SFE_C Actual 
Jan-02 20.86 24.70 21.01 22.66 22.03 20.38 6.59 
Feb-02 21.51 27.58 24.32 27.16 21.78 20.35 9.67 
Mar-02 28.05 34.68 28.30 32.34 27.46 26.14 13.11 
Apr-02 34.20 41.84 34.77 47.70 31.38 29.15 17.44 
May-02 32.71 38.77 33.64 34.47 33.03 31.73 15.38 
Jun-02 33.27 41.92 35.06 35.07 31.86 31.10 17.74 
Jul-02 30.83 39.45 32.56 33.07 29.29 28.43 16.55 
Aug-02 31.34 40.52 32.94 31.20 31.24 30.55 17.85 
Sep-02 35.09 43.09 36.37 33.46 34.03 33.55 15.56 
Oct-02 38.05 44.33 38.69 42.54 34.43 33.76 17.34 
Nov-02 36.53 40.52 36.45 35.38 34.05 34.39 14.01 
Dec-02 43.57 48.84 43.83 40.28 39.97 40.41 11.74 
Jan-03 51.86 60.30 53.08 52.49 48.46 47.79 17.78 
Feb-03 86.39 101.02 92.55 102.43 46.47 48.30 19.31 
Mar-03 66.47 75.66 69.10 74.70 42.68 41.76 31.04 
Apr-03 50.53 58.59 52.50 59.83 42.04 43.89 16.57 
WAP 46.97 55.37 49.00 51.56 32.82 31.87 16.15 
PC Margin - 17.7% 4.3% 9.8% - -3.4% -50.9% 
 
Several issues can contribute to the relatively effici nt BEU market. The high 
volume of forward contracts decreases the incentive of major market players to raise 
real-time market prices. If forward contract volume decreases, real-time BEU price may 
increase. The high capacity reserve margin of ERCOT (34% for 2002 and 21% for 
2003) presumably also contributes to the relatively fficient BEU market as we 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
The inefficient performance of BED market may be caused by the following 
factors. Technical limits, such as unit commitment, low generation limits, and 
operational constraints can result in relatively high adjustment costs that make firms not 
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willing to decrease their generation levels. This, on the other hand, may also indicate 
the inefficiency of their forward decisions, or difficulty in adjusting their forward 
decisions. Currently ERCOT is undergoing a market redesign process. A day-ahead 
energy market will be implemented for the new market, which will be helpful to 
improve the efficiency of forward contract decisions. However, the mitigation effect of 
forward contracts will decrease if market players decrease their forward contracts. 
Furthermore, some firms may not want to expose themselves to the real-time market 
opened three years ago, and hold some of their capacity to cover their native load in 
case of any unexpected situation. Another possibility is that the small profit from the 
low transaction volume in the ERCOT real-time market does not out-weigh the cost for 
changing their previous practices before the real-time market opened.  
 4.5  CONCLUSIONS 
An asymmetric linear Supply Function Equilibrium model with transmission 
constraints is proposed to develop firms’ optimal bidding strategies given their forward 
contracts. Equilibrium conditions are derived and discussed for different situations. 
The proposed model is applied to simulate the bidding behavior in the real-time 
balancing energy market of ERCOT from January 2002 to April 2003. Market power 
mitigation effects of forward contracts are evaluated. The estimated contracted SFE 
prices match the actual market prices of balancing up energy well. However, the actual 
average balancing down energy prices is found to be much lower than the estimated 
contracted SFE prices, which indicates that some market participants did not choose to 
buy available cheaper energy in the real-time market to supply their contract 
obligations. Adjustment costs, hedging risk costs, and other individual consideration 
may contribute to the unwillingness of some participants to decrease their generation 
output in the real-time market.  
Competitive forward contract markets and a day-ahead m rket will be helpful to 
increase the efficiency of forward decisions. If the volume of forward contracts 
decreases, the market price of real-time balancing up energy may increase because the 
mitigation of forward contracts will decrease. 
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Our model can be used to analyze the effect of different level forward contracts 
on real-time market prices. It can also be extended to analyze the interaction between 
day-ahead market and real-time market, the market power related to TCRs, or 
estimation of the possible market results with different ownership structure in the 
future. 
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CHAPTER 5:  SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
5.1  SUMMARY  
In this dissertation, models are developed to analyze the electricity market 
efficiency and bidding strategies of market participants. Because the physical 
characteristics of electric power have important effects on the electricity markets, the 
proposed models emphasize on the transmission constraint . A principal contribution of 
this dissertation is the incorporation of transmission constraints into the competitive 
benchmark evaluation. Another principal contribution f this dissertation is the 
incorporation of transmission constraints and transmis ion congestion rights into a 
numerically tractable SFE framework. These models are pplied to simulate the 
ERCOT real-time balancing energy market from January 2002 to April 2003.  
For the models estimating the competitive benchmark, transmission constraints 
and operational constraints, which are neglected in most of the empirical literature, are 
considered. Although the competitive benchmark approach can evaluate market 
performance, it cannot provide the reasons for the market inefficiency. Many issues can 
contribute to the market inefficiency, such as market design flaws, market power, and 
inherent engineering features of power system operations. This dissertation focuses on 
the effects of transmission and operational constraints on the market efficiency first. 
Models are developed to estimate how transmission and operational constraints affect 
market prices based on the actual market bids.  
These market efficiency analysis models are applied to the efficiency analysis of 
the ERCOT real-time energy market by simulating its operation from January 2002 to 
April 2003. The ERCOT market is undertaking a market edesign rulemaking process. 
Evaluation of the performance of its current market is helpful for this policy process. 
The results show that the balancing up energy market is relatively efficient, and the 
balancing down energy market is relatively inefficient during the test period. It is also 
found that transmission congestion had more impact on he market performance than 
did operational constraints. However, operational constraints and CSC congestion did 
not contribute much to the relatively uncompetitive performance of the balancing down 
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energy market. This indicates that the bid behavior of market participants contributes to 
the most of the performance of the balancing down energy market. 
A linear asymmetric SFE model with transmission constraints is proposed to 
analyze the bidding strategies with forward contracts. In electricity markets, firms 
compete through both spot market bidding and bilateral contract trading. Firms have to 
consider their forward contract positions when they make spot market decisions. The 
proposed SFE model is used to develop firms’ optimal bidding strategies with the 
consideration of forward contracts both for energy and transmission. The characteristics 
of firms’ behaviors are analyzed for different situations under the induced equilibrium 
conditions. The model contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, forward 
contracts, transmission constraints, and multi-period strategy (an obligation for firms to 
bid consistently over an extended time horizon such as a day or an hour) are integrated 
into the linear asymmetric SFE framework. As an ex-ante model, it can provide 
qualitative insights into firms’ behaviors. Second, the bidding strategies related to 
Transmission Congestion Rights (TCRs) are discussed by interpreting TCRs as linear 
combination of forwards. Third, the model is a general one in the sense that there is no 
limitation on the number of firms and scale of the network, which can have asymmetric 
linear marginal cost structures.   
In addition to the theoretical analysis based on the SFE model, we apply our 
SFE model to simulate the bidding behavior in the ERCOT real-time market. Most 
applications of oligopoly models focus on contract markets or day-ahead pool markets. 
Our model shows that the real-time market analysis is also valuable even when it is 
relatively small in trading quantity. The simulated SFE prices for balancing up energy 
services match the actual market prices well. In cotrast, the estimated SFE prices for 
balancing down energy services do not match the actual market prices well, which 
indicates some market participants do no like to change their forward contract position 
through real-time market, even though there are cheaper supplies available. The 
adjustment costs, hedging risk cost, and other individual consideration may contribute 
the unwillingness of generators to take part in the real-time balancing down market in 
ERCOT during the test time period. 
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Several issues can contribute to the relatively effici nt BEU market. The high 
volume of forward contracts decreases the incentive of major market player to raise 
real-time market prices. If forward contract volume decreases, real-time BEU price may 
increase. The high capacity reserve margins in ERCOT presumably also contributed to 
the competitive performance of the BEU market. Several circumstances, including the 
transmission interconnection rules and the renewable energy credit-trading program, 
have encouraged significant new generation investments in ERCOT since 1995. The 
reserve margins were 34% and 21% for 2002 and 2003, respectively.  
The inefficient performance of BED market may be caused by the following 
factors. Technical limits, such as unit commitment, low generation limits, and 
operational constraints can result in relatively high adjustment costs that make firms not 
willing to decrease their generation levels. This, on the other hand, may also indicate 
the inefficiency of their forward decisions, or difficulty in adjusting their forward 
decisions. Furthermore, some firms may not want to expose themselves to the real-time 
market opened three years ago, and hold their capacity to cover their native load in case 
of any unexpected situation. Another possibility is that the small profit from the low 
volume real-time market does not out-weigh the cost f r changing their previous 
practices before the ERCOT real-time market opened. 
Three-part bid (energy, start-up, and no load cost bid), centralized unit-
commitment, competitive forward contract markets, and day-ahead energy market could 
be helpful to increase the efficiency of market participants’ forward decisions. Market 
power mitigation for balancing energy bids will also be helpful to limit the deviation of 
major players’ bids from their marginal costs.  
5.2 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although the empirical analysis in this dissertation f cus on the ERCOT real-
time market, the proposed general theoretical models for the market efficiency and 
bidding strategy analysis in this dissertation are pplicable to the market analysis with 
different market structures, including the one that ERCOT market will possibly become 
and the transitional period from current market structure to the new market structure. 
 106  
The proposed models can also be extended to study other issues important in 
electricity markets: 
• Unit commitment can be included in the process for the marginal cost 
estimation for the system or a market participant, which will extend the 
models by considering the unit start up or shunt down characteristics; 
• Market power related to transmission congestion (ownership of 
transmission congestion rights) can be analyzed based on the framework 
in Chapter 4; 
• Based on the long-term relationship of real-time market prices and 
contract prices, the equilibrium between day-ahead m rket and real-time 
market can be analyzed; 
• The effects of different contract level on spot market can be evaluated 
by changing the contract level; 
• The possible market results from different divesture st ucture. 
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APPENDIX A COMPUTATIONAL ISSUES  
A.1  INTRODUCTION  
This dissertation analyzes the real-time ERCOT BES energy market data in an 
attempt to find the underline behavior of the market and its participants. Extensive 
computations have been performed in this process. However, as long as producing 
correct data, the computational procedures themselve  are of less importance comparing 
to the model construction, data, and information extraction. To keep the discussion of 
market insights from being disrupted, we omit all the computational issues in the 
chapters, and give a description of them in this appendix.  
The computation in this dissertation mainly involves optimization problems 
such as solving nonlinear equations and math programming problems with integral-type 
objective functions. Some statistical procedures are also performed to extract useful 
information from a large amount of data. In this appendix, we will first give a brief 
description of the computer environment, in which the computations have been 
performed. Then we describe a linear programming approach to solve the math 
programming problems with integral-type objective functions.  
A.2  COMPUTATIONAL ENVIRONMENT  
Major computations are performed with MATLAB 6.5 ona Linux workstation 
(with 1GB memory and a 1.8GHz Xeon processor). To solve optimization problems, we 
also use the Optimization Toolbox (version 2.3) that came with the MATLAB.   
The raw data for this dissertation came in the form f Microsoft Excel files. 
Other statistical computations and data clean work are performed with MS Excel and 
MATLAB on a PC with a 2.4GHz Pentium 4 processor.  
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A.3  A LINEAR PROGRAMMING APPROACH  
In this dissertation, we constantly need to nonlinear math programming 







)( ,                                                 (A1) 





                                                   (A2) 
where )( ii qC  is a continuous nonlinear function with non-decreasing derivative on iq .  
This problem can be solved as a general nonlinear constrained optimization 
problem. However, due to constraints, it usually takes a long time to solve, and the 
results tend to be inaccurate. We propose to reform the problem into a linear 
programming problem, which can be solved with high accuracy with modern 
algorithms. The resulting linear problem has much more variables, yet can be solved 
much faster with high accuracy.  
We define the following variables:  
niujx iij ,,1,,,1,10  ==≤≤ . 











α ,                                                (A3) 
subject to: 






, ni ,,1 = ,                      (A4) 
where niujjCjC iiiij ,,1,,,1),1()(  ==−−=α . 





1 == = .                                                (A5) 
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This result follows from the fact that )( ii qC  has non-decreasing derivative on iq , 
ni ,,1 = .  
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